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The  theory  of  money  that  emerged  from  the  Keynesian  Revolution  is coming 
increasingly  into  question,  and  a variety  of  new  theories  are  being  put  forward  as 
alternatives.  The  most  promising  is one  I will  call  the  finance  constraint  theory.  This  paper 
is  a progress  report  on  its development.  It is particularly  fitting  that  this  progress  report 
appear  in  a fesrschrift  for  S.C.  Tsiang,  as he  has  been  one  of  the  most  cogent  critics  of  the 
conventional  theory  and  a major  architect  of  the  finance  constraint  alternative. 
The  issues  a theory  of  money  should  address  may  be divided  into  three  broad  ‘areas: 
(1)  What  is money  and  how  is it special?  (2) What  is the  connection  between  money  and 
its various  “prices”  (the  general  price  level,  interest  rates,  and  exchange  rates)?  (3)  What  is 
the  role  of  money  in economic  fluctuations.  3  After  some  introductory  material,  each  of 
these  areas  will  be  taken  up  in turn. 
I.  THE  CONVENTIONAL  THEORY  AND  ITS PROIJLEMS 
The  theory  of  money  that  is generally  taught  today  has  its intellectual  origins  in  two 
works  of  the  1930s~Hicks’  “A  suggestion  for  simplifying  the  theory  of  money”  ( 1935)  and 
Keynes’  liquidity  preference  theory  of  interest  (Keynes,  1936).’  Although  the  motivation 
in each  case  was  somewhat  different,  the  theoretical  frameworks  were  very  similar. 
Hicks’  motivation  was  essentially  methodological-to  integrate  money  into  the 
framework  of  constrained  individual  choice.  To  do  this,  he  formulated  a portfolio  problem 
in  which  wealth  was  allocated  across  assets  in  the  same  way  that  income  was  allocated 
across  goods  in  the  standard  consumer  problem.  In  the  context  of  this  portfolio  problem, 
*An earlier version of this paper  circulated under the titl  c “The Finance  Constraint  Comes  of Age:  A 
Survey  of Some  Recent Developments  in the Theory  of Money.”  I am grateful  co Yoav  Kislev,  Martin 
Shubik,  Alan  Stockman,  and  Lxs  Svcnsson  for comments  on that version. 
‘This  is as true of  Friedman’s  “~lonctarism”  as it is of  work  more  avowedly  Keynesian  (see  Patinkin, 
1973).  Attempts  to provide  a distinct  thcorctical  framework  for Monetarism  have  largely  been judged  a 
failure  (Wood,  1981) money  was seen as neither  more  nor less than one particular  asset:  its role  as medium  of 
exchange  was relegated  to the background  as part of the tastes implicitly  underlying 
demand.2 
Keynes’ motivation  was different.  He needed  a new theory  of the interest  rate  to close 
his General  Theory,  having  transformed  the traditional  theory,  based on saving  and 
investment,  into  a theory  of income  determination.  Keynes  built  his new  theory  of the 
interest  rate on the speculative  demand  for money  that he had developed  in the Treatise 
(1930).3  This  new  theory  meshed  well  with  Hicks’ theory  of money.  In both,  money  was 
seen primarily  as an asset,  and supply  and demand  in the “market  for money”  were seen as 
determining  the “price” of this asset-the  rate of interest.4 
In the theory  of money  that grew out of these two works,  which  I will  call  the the 
liquidity preference  theory, the central  construct  was the demand  for money.  This  interacted 
with  supply  in a metaphorical  “market” for money.5  The models  were generally 
aggregative,  analyzing  the market  for money  either  alone  or as an adjunct  to some sort of 
Keynesian  macro  model  or neoclassical  growth  model.  Although  the theory  was not 
formally  derived  from any microeconomic  foundations,  it was widely  believed  that 
Patinkin’s  “integration  of monetary  and value  theory”  had provided  a valid  underpinning. 
The  liquidity  preference  theory  came under attack  in the late  196Os, most  notably  by 
Clower  (1967,  1968,  1970), Hahn  (1965,  1969,  1971), and  Tsiang  (1966,  1969),  on  what 
were essentially  logical  grounds.  It was not initially  any empirical  failure  that brought  it 
into question,  but rather  its failure  to meet cernain standards  of coherence  and logical 
consistency.  All three critics attacked  both the superstructure  of the theory,  with  its 
positive  and normative  results on inflation  and growth,  and the implicit  foundations  in the 
work of Pa&kin  for basically  the same reason:  none of the models  gave  formal  expression 
to what it was that money  actually  did. The problem  with the liquidity  preference  theory 
was its “neglect  of the nature of the technology  of monetary  exchange”  (Clower,  197 1 , p 
36).  Thefunction  of money  had been  pushed too far into  the background.  If the function 
2See  Hicks  (1982,  p 8). Looking  at money  in this way,  as no more  than a particular  asset,  was the 
cul.mination  of a line of development,  associated  principally  with Cambridge,  that had run  from  Marshall’s 
cash-balance  version  of the quantity  theory  through  the speculative  demand  for money  of Keynes’  Trearise 
(1930)  (see  Laidler,  1986b. and Bridel,  1987).  It was  indeed  the  Imcr  t_hx provided  Hicks  with  his  point  of 
departure  . 
3For more  detailed  discussion  see Kohn (1986). 
41n Friedman’s  work  the  “price” is the general  price  level:  in the monetary  approach  to the balance  of 
payments,  it is the exchange  rate. 
%o  pervasive  has this theory  become  that it is hard today  to remember  that the “market  for money”  is 
indeed a metaphor,  a theoretical  consmict,  and one that would have seemed  strange  to earlier  genentions  of 
monetary  theorists. 3 
of  money  was  given  no  formal  expression,  how  could  even  the  positive  results,  let  alone 
the  normative,  be  taken  seriously?6 
Specifically,  Clower  (1967)  showed  that  in  Patinkin’s  formal  model  “money”  was  no 
more  a means  of  payment  than  any  other  good.  Supposing,  for  example,  a rigid  money 
wage  and  an excess  supply  of  labor,  an increase  in the  endowment  of  labor  would  have  the 
same  effect  in  increasing  demand  and  so employment  as would  an equivalent  increase  in 
holdings  of  money.  Furthermore,  Hahn  (1965)  showed  that  Patinkin’s  economy 
possessed  an  equilibrium  in  which  money  had  no  value,  implying  that  the  economy  could 
function  perfectly  well  with  no  money  at all.  Clearly,  whatever  it was  that  Patinkin 
believed  money  did,  that  function  found  no  formal  expression  in  his  model. 
The  aggregative  models  were  no  better  than  their  microfoundations.  In  them,  an  asset 
called  “money”  was  typically  tacked  on  to  a “nonmonetary”  neoclassical  growth  model. 
Many  of  the  results  were  paradoxical:  welfare  was  reduced  by  the  “introduction”  of 
money;  inflation  was  possible  with  a constant  quantity  of  money,  and  such  an  inflation 
could  be  moderated  by  monetary  expansion  (Howitt,  1973,  and  Goldman,  1973). 
In  a paper  that  was  to  prove  seminal,  Clower  (1967)  suggested,  as  a way  out  of  this 
confusion,  a different  way  of  modelling  money.  He  suggested  that  the  standard  budget 
constraint  of  value  theory  be replaced  by  a more  complicated  set of  finance  constraints  to 
ensure  that  in the  model  all  purchases  be made  with  money.  This  would  give  formal 
expression  to  the  essential  and  unique  function  of  money-its  role  as medium  of  exchange.’ 
Of  course,  the  idea  of  seeing  money  essentially  as a medium  of  exchange,  and  of 
downplaying  or even  ignoring  its role  as an  asset,  was  not  new.  It had  been  characteristic 
of  Classical  monetary  theory  before  the  rise  of  the  Cambridge  School  and  its culmination  in 
the  liquidity  preference  theory  of  Hicks  and  Keynes  (Laidler,  1986b,  1989).  That  older 
tradition  had  continued  in the  work  of  Dennis  Robertson,  a major  early  critic  of  the  liquidity 
preference  theory,  and  in  that  of  S.C.  Tsiang.  Indeed,  in  1966,  Tsiang  had  published  a 
6This  is not to say that Friedman  and Patinkin  had nothing  to say about  the economic  role  of  money: 
both  discussed  it at length.  However,  theirformal  models  were  quite  silent  on the subject,  and this silence 
was deliberate:  explicit  modelling  of the technology  of exchange  “was unnecessary  for understanding 
monetary  relationships,  just  as it was unnecessary  to describe  the technology  of  pin-making  when 
analyzing  the price/output  behavior  of iitms  in the pin-making  industry”  (Friedman,  responding  to Clowcr. 
in Clayton  et al,  1971, pp.  2 and 36). 
‘Much  earlier,  Brunner  ( 195 1) had argued  that Patinkin’s  method  of  placing  real balances  in the utility 
function  was sufficient  but nof. as Patinkin  claimed,  necessary  for a resolution  of the  “classical  dichotomy.” 
Brunner  suggested  as an alternative,  a constraint,  additional  to the overall  budget  constraint,  that would 
restrict  the rate of utilization  of money  (and so spending).  The ground  proved  infertile  for this idea at the 
time-it  was the solution  to a problem  that was not yet perccivcd  to exist-and  a quarter  of a century  was to 
pass before  Glower’s  very  similar  suggestion  was to take root  successfully. 4 
paper,  very  much  in the Robertsonian  tradition,  that went considerably  beyond  Clower’s in 
its treatment  of finance  constraints.s 
Nonetheless,  it was Clower’s paper  that caught  the imagination  of the profession  and 
gave rise to a substantial  literature  on the “New Microfoundations”  of money.  This 
literature  was concerned  primarily  with justifying  the existence  of finance  consnaints:  little 
attempt  was made  to apply  them  to substantive  questions.  Indeed,  Barro  and Fischer, 
reviewing  this literature  in  1976, were moved  to comment,  “It is not clear  where,  if 
anywhere,  it will  lead..  . It is doubtful  that [it] will have  any major  consequences  for the 
way in which  macro-models  are built.”  This  rather  pessimistic  assessment  proved  to be 
wrong  because  of another  theoretical  development  of the  197Os, the New Classical 
Revolution. 
There  are two reasons  why  the New Classical  Revolution  gave renewed  impetus  to the 
finance  constraint  approach-one  methodological,  the other  substantive. 
A major  element,  some  believe  the essence,  of the New Classical  Revolution  was its 
rejection  of broad-brush  aggregative  models,  subject  to the “Lucas critique”  in favor  of 
simple  optimizing  models  firmly  grounded  in tastes and technology.  In building  such 
models,  the question  naturally  arose  of how  to model  money  in a structural  way.  Clower’s 
fmance  constraint  was conveniently  at hand  to provide  a ready-made  answer:  money 
should  enter  the model  via a carefully  specified  technology  of exchange.  As Clower  and 
Hahn  had pointed  out, the liquidity  preference  theory  had produced  models  of precisely  the 
type rejected  by the New Classical  school:  asset demands,  including  the demand  for 
money,  were postulated  directly,  rather  than  being derived  formally  from any  “deep 
structure.” 
For different  reasons,  finance  constraints  also proved  appealing  to many  critics  of the 
New Classical  economics.  While  conceding  the methodological  flaws of the aggregative 
Keynesian  model,  many  found  the New Classical  description  of a perfectly  coordinated 
economy  unconvincing.  But if the economy  was not perfectly  coordinated,  why  not?  Why 
was coordination  in the real world  more of a problem  than it was in New Classical  models’? 
One possible  answer  lay in the incompleteness  of financial  markets  as a consequence  of 
*A major  failing  of Clower’s  treatment  was its attempt  to describe  a dynamic  process  with a static 
equilibrium  model.  The  two parts of  Clower’s dichotomized  budget  constraint  were never  explicitly  linked 
up, as they  could  not be without  adding  a time  dimension  to the model.  One  result  was an unsatisfactory, 
if unavoidable,  reticence  about  the capital  market:  the introduction  of a capital  market  in this static  model 
would  have  reduced  the dichotomized  budget  constraint  to the usual single one.  Tsaing’s paper,  on the other 
hand,  was fully  dynamic  and included  a capital  market. 5 
asymmetric  information  and transactions  costs.  Incomplete  financial  markets  implied 
finance  constraints,  among  them  finance  constraints  involving  money.9 
How  important  are  finance  constraints  empirically?  Some  evidence  has  been  provided 
by  work,  not  directly  related  to  the  theory  of  money,  on  the  “excess  sensitivity”  of 
consumption  to current  income  and  of  investment  to current  earnings.  This  work  has 
confirmed  the  importance  of  finance  constraints  for  many  consumers  and  firms  (Deaton, 
1986;  Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Peterson,  1987). 
II.  THE  FINANCE  CONSTRAINT  THEORY 
The  finance  constraint  theory  begins  explicitly  with  precisely  the  “deep  structure”  that 
the  liquidity  preference  theory  leaves  implicit.  Thefrlnction  of  money  is central  rather  than 
its  value  as  an  asset. 
Because  of  problems  of  asymmetric  information,  agents  are  constrained  in  their  ability 
to command  current  resources  by  more  than  simply  their  subjective  evaluation  of  some 
intertemporal  budget  constraint.  There  is a system  of  monetary-financial  institutions  whose 
purpose  is  to deal  with  these  informational  problems  and  to regulate  individuals’  current 
spending-their  exercise  of  “effective  demand.”  Money  is part  of  this  system  of  regulation. 
It is easiest  to  illustrate  the  finance  constraint  theory  with  a simple  “cash-in-advance” 
model  (similar  to one  first  su ggested  by  Howitt,  1973  and  1973): 
Individuals  receive  a weekly  endowment  of  goods  “as mmna  from  heaven.”  The 
endowment  is specialized.  but  individuals  wish  to consume  3 broad  spectrum  of  goods. 
Problems  of  asymmetric  information  are  so  severe  that  they  preclude  any  kind  of  credit,  so 
a quid pro quo is required  for  each  exchange.  An  efficient  mangement  in  such 
circumstances  (see  Section  III  below)  is a system  of  trade  involving  “shops,”  with  the  quid 
pro  quo requirement  being  met  by  individuals  payin, u for  their  acquisitions  wirh  money. 
At  the  beginning  of  each  “week”  individuals  deliver  to  shops  the  quantities  of  goods 
they  wish  to  exchange  for  other  goods.  During  the  week  they  go  from  shop  to  shop to 
obtain  the goods  they  want  in exchange  for  the  ones  they  have  given  up  ieach  shop  is 
specialized  in  a small  subset  of  goods).  Prices  ;LTe  assumed  to  be at their  equilibrium 
levels.  lo  . 
If  individual  i holds  an  amount  of  money  ~Ii,  at the  beginning  of  week  t, his 
acquisitions  are  constrained  by 
9Cf. Gertler  (1988). 
lOAttention  focuses  here on the technology  oi exchange  to the neglsct  of price  determination;  the 




c P:,  din  I  Mi, 
n=l 
where  p:  is the  current  money  price  of  good  n,  and  d:,  is the  current  acquisition  of  that 
good. 
The  money  that  shops  collect  in this  way  is paid  out  at the  end  of  the  week  to  those  who 
supplied  the  shops  with  goods  at the  beginning  of  the  week.  Hence, 
(2) 
M,,=  f  p;‘s;; 
n=l 
Note  that  the  money  constraining  purchases  in  week  t according  to  (1) originates  in  the 
sales  of  the  preceding  week.  Goods  currently  offered  for  sale  do  not  contribute  to current 
purchasing  power,  they  will  do  so only  after  they  have  been  sold.” 
Simple  cash-in-advance  models  like  this  are  sometimes  viewed  as embodiments  of  the 
“only  money  matters”  view  of  money  and  credit.  This  is not  the  case.  They  are,  in  fact, 
crude  examples  of  a functional  theory  of  financial  institutions  in  which  money  is simply 
one  extreme  of  a money-credit  continuum.  As  we  shall  see  in  Section  III,  the  fundamental 
structure  underlying  ail  financial  institutions-the  problem  of  asymmenic  information-is 
essentially  the  same. 
The  generalization  of  the  simple  cash-in-advance  model  to include  a broader  range  of 
financial  institutions-consumer  credit,  trade  credit,  the  borrowing  of  money  from  others,  or 
the  sale  of  other  assets  for  money-is  fairly  straightforward.  This  generalization  has  several 
important  implications.  First,  agents  no  longer  face  a strict  cash-in-advance  constraint: 
there  is no  longer  any  necessary  connection  between  the  cash  with  which  they  enter  the 
period  and  the  purchases  they  may  make.  Even  if they  must  pay  for  their  purchases  with 
cash,  they  may  borrow  this  cash  from  others.  12 (Hence,  I prefer  the  namefinance 
constraint  for  the  general  class  of  model,  reserving  the  term  “cash-in-advance  constraint” 
for  models  with  no  asset  markets.)  Second,  the  introduction  of  other  assets  removes  one 
major  source  of  potential  misinterpretation  of  the  simple  cash-in-advance  model.  Since 
1  ‘Cf  Robertson  (1933): 
I assume  the  existence  of a period  of tune,  to be called  a “day,” which  is finite  but 
nevertheless  so short  that the income  which  a man rcce~vcs on a given  day cannot  be allocated 
during  its course  to any  particular  use.  X man’s disposable  Income-the  income  about  which  the 
question  arises  on any particular  day as to whether  it shall be “saved” or “spent”-is  thus the 
income  received  not on that day but on the previous  one. 
l*There  is one  specification  in which  assets are “iiliquid”  in that they exacerbate  rather  than relieve  the 
cash-in-advance  constraint  (see  Kohn,  1981a).  Most work  has used  “liquid asset” specifications,  but 
Helpman  and Razin  (1985)  use an iiliquid asset  model  to examine  the effect  of the volume  of  financial 
transactions  in a given  currency  on its rate of exchange. 7 
money  is the  only  store  of  value  in  that  model,  money-holding  is inextricably  mixed  up 
with  saving,  making  it hard  to  separate  money-holding  behavior  from  saving  behavior. 
For  example,  Lucas  (1980)  and  Helpman  (198 la)  use  this  type  of  simple  model,  with 
income  or  tastes  uncertain,  to  study  the  precautionary  demand  for  money.  They  obtain 
results  very  reminiscent  of  those  obtained  by  Foley  and  Hellwig  (1975)  in a study  of 
saving  behavior  when  income  is uncertain.13 
Although  asset  markets  relieve  the  cash-in-advance  constraint  on  the  individual,  there 
remains  a cash-in-advance  constraint  on  aggregate  spending  (see  Kohn,  198 la). 
Individuals  may  redistribute  the  total  money  available  to  be  spent  among  themselves  by 
trading  assets,  but  that  total  still  constrains  what  all of  them  taken  together  may  spend. 
While  individuals  need  not  be  aware  of  this  aggregate  finance  constraint,  their  behavior  will 
be  made  consistent  with  it through  their  response  to  its  “shadow  price,”  the  rate  of  interest. 
The  peculiar  properties  of  finance  constraint  models  are  the  result  of  the  difference 
between  the  set  of  constraints  in these  models  and  the  simple  present-value  inter-temporal 
budget  constraint  agents  face  in a model  with  complete  financial  markets. 
The  first  such  property  is a “wedge”  between  purchase  price  and  sales  price.  Payment 
for  goods  with  money  implies  a lag  between  the  sale  of  goods  and  the  subsequent  purchase 
of  goods  (or,  for  firms,  between  the  purchase  of  inputs  and  the  sale  of  output).  If agents 
exhibit  time  preference,  or  if the  value  of  money  is changing,  this  “time  wedge”  between 
sale  and  purchase  will  imply  a price  wedge  (,TVilson,  1979:  Kohn.  1984). 
For  example,  for  the  simple  cash-in-advance  model,  combining  i 1)  and  (2)  (assuming 
that  all  money  is spent),  we  have 
N  t 
(3)  c  pi1  (  s:;  -+d:,)  =0 
Tl=l  Ptl 
Note  that  this  time-wedge  will  be present  even  if the  individual  cash-in-advance  constraint 
is not  binding-if  agents  can  borrow  and  lend  freely,  for  example. 
This  “distortion”  will  in  general  be a source  of  “inefficiency”:  the  law  of  one  price  will 
be violated  as agents  face  different  relative  prices,  depending  on  what  they  buy  and  sell, 
and  depending  on  the  length  of  their  trading  intenals.13  Great  care  must  be  taken, 
however,  in  drawing  normative  conclusions.  Inefficiency  relative  to  what?  Costless 
t3Cf.  Hahn  (1982.  p 21):  “A surprisingly  large  number  of rcccnt  papers  that have  taken  money  to be 
the only  means  of  intertemporal  substitution  have  thereby  missed  some  of the central  issues  of  the subject. 
apart  from  providing  a very  unrobust  theory..  .” 
Foley  and Hellwig  have  a positive-net-worth  constraint  in place of a finance  constraint.  Their  model 
actually  began  life as a model  of the demand  for money,  but the authors  rightly  concluded  that such an 
interpretation  was invalid. 
14This distortion  considerably  complicates  proof  of the existence  of an equilibrium  (Townsend,  1987). 8 
instantaneous  trade in the absence  of informational  problems?  We will return  to this in the 
discussion  of the optimum  quantity  of money  in Section  IV.C. 
The existence  of this time wedge  between  purchase  and sale is fundamental  to finance 
constraint  models.  If purchases  and sales were simultaneous,  the finance  constraint  would 
disappear,  goods  would  buy goods  directly,  and money  would  have  no explicit  role  in the 
formal  model  as a medium  of exchange. 
The  second  basic property  of finance  constraint  models  is present  only  if finance 
constraints  are binding,  so that agents  face a sequence  of constraints,  rather  than  a single 
intertemporal  budget  constraint  (in Hahn’s term, if we have  a “true sequence  economy”). 
ln this case, the circular  flow  of payments  from one agent  to another  becomes  important, 
the spending  of one  agent  affecting  the constraints  of others,  causing  multiplier  effects. 
These  multiplier  effects  result  in certain  kinds of dynamics-self-fulfilling-expectations 
“sunspot”  equilibria  and chaotic  dynamics-that  are absent  from models  with complete 
financial  markets. 
Note that care must be taken  to link  up finance  constraint  models  in an internally 
consistent  way,  so that money  spent by one  agent  is received  by another.  This  can  be a 
particular  problem  for representative  agent models;15  a finance  constraint  model  really 
requires  a heterogeneity  of agents,  so that the money  outflow  of one can be matched  by the 
money  inflow  of another.  This  heterogeneity,  the basis for various  distribution  effects  that 
cannot  occur  in a representative  agent model,  often  turns out to be important  and we will 
see later that it underlies  some  important  results. 
III.  MICR~F~UNDATI~NS 
Clower’s  1967 paper  stimulated  a flurry  of activity  in the early  1970s on the 
foundations  of monetary  theory. 16 Since  that literature  is sumeyed  in detail  in Barro  and 
Fischer  (1976),  I will summarize  here only  the broad conclusions  significant  for the more 
recent  work  that  builds  upon  it. 
The  New Microfoundations  literature  differs  from earlier  work,  for instance  that of 
Baumol  and Tobin,  in looking  at money  from a social  rather  than from  purely  an individual 
point  of view.  For the individual,  money  is just  the most  liquid  of assets,  and the theory  of 
money  is grounded  in the inventory  and portfolio  problems  of the individual.  Such a 
‘jThe  models  of Grandmont  and Younes  (1972,  1973). Fried  (1973),  Stockman  (1981),  and Feenstra 
(1985)  could  be criticized  on these  grounds.  Akerlof  (1973).  while he does not explicitly  talk of a finance 
constraint,  is very  much  concerned  with closure  of his model  in terms of the circular  flow  of  payments. 
‘6To  be distinguished  from  the literature  on quantity-constrained  real equilibrium  that grew  out of 
Clower  (1965).  This  latter  litcraturc  is surveyed  by Drazen  (1980)  who  notes  that in it money plays no 
essential  role. 9 
theory,  for example,  understands  the effects  of inflation  in terms of a distortion  of 
individual  portfolios.  The  New Microfoundations  literature,  on the other  hand,  sees money 
as an institution  enabling  the division  of labor  and multilateral  trade in a world of 
asymmetric  information  and transactions  costs.  The effects  of inflation,  using  the same 
example,  are to be understood,  in this case,  in terms of the damage  done  to this institution 
and in the consequent  reduction  in the scope of trade. 
The key to understanding  money  lies in the difficulties  of decentralized  multilateral 
trade:  rather  than trading  with a Walrasian  auctioneer,  individuals  must trade with one 
another.  Widespread  specialization  will generally  preclude  a double  coincidence  of wants, 
so that delivery  of good  A today  to one  individual  must be balanced  by receipt  of good  B 
from  some other  individual  at some other  place and time.  Such an arrangement  inevitably 
poses  the problem  of honesty  or trust.(Howitt,  1973;  Shubik,  1973;  Ostroy  and Starr, 
1974;  Lucas,  1980;  Gale,  1982)  An individual  having  traded future  delivery  of good  B 
for current  delivery  of good  A faces a “time consistency”  problem:  once  he has received 
and consumed  A, it becomes  tempting  for him to go back on his promise  to deliver  B.17 
Clearly  some method  must be found  to guarantee  performance.  Simple  bilateral 
contracts  will  not do, because,  apart from  the cost, it is of the essence  in this sort of 
decentralized  multilateral  trade that at the time good A is delivered,  the nature of good  B and 
the identity  of its future  supplier  may  be quite  unknown.  All that is known  is that the 
system  is obliged  to provide  10 the individual  givin,  0 up good A something  of equal  value 
later and that the individual  taking  delivery  of good A has a reciprocal  obligation  to provide 
something  of equal  value  to the system. 
While,  in principle,  this could  all be organized  by a centralized  system  of clearing  and 
monitoring,  the informational  and computational  costs  would  seem prohibitive.18  In the 
absence  of such a centralized  system,  a simple  decentralized  solution  is to obviate  any need 
for trust or record-keeping  by insisting  that each  trade be self-enforcing,  that the individual 
receiving  good  A give  up to the supplier  something  of equal  value,  a quidpro  quo. 
The  question,  then,  is how this requirement  for a quidpro  qrlo  might  best be satisfied. 
One possibility  is bilateral  barter involving  intermediate  trades in unwanted  goods. 
However,  this may  be infeasible,  even  if equilibrium  prices  are known,  certainly  if they 
are not;  in any case,  it is unlikely  to be efficient.  The  use of some standard  means  of 
“Ostroy  (1973)  calls  this a problem  of  “behavioral  feasibility.”  Gale  (1982)  treats  the trust  problem 
in terms  of a “sequential  core”  which  cannot  be “blocked”  by a single  individual  opting  out of his 
commitments. 
‘*The  existence  of  such a system  is simply  assumed  in the “moneyless”  models  of the type  discused 
by Fama  (1980)  and Black  (1970). 10 
payment-one  good  serving  as a qtidpro  quo  in  all trades-makes  the  attainment  of  a 
desirable  allocation  possible,  or,  if it is already  possible,  reduces  the  cost  of  attaining  it 
(Ostroy,  1973;  Jones,  1976;  Ostroy  and  Starr,  1976;  Feldman,  1973;  Harris,  1979;  Oh, 
1986;  Iwai,  1988).  Token  money,  of  little  or  no  intrinsic  value,  makes  an  efficient  and 
inexpensive  means  of  payment.  19 It acquires  value  precisely  because  it is required  as a 
means  of  payment  in all  trades.  Of  course,  to perform  this  function  well  it is essential  that 
the  value  of  money  in  terms  of  goods  remain  stable.*O 
Individuals  having  to  meet  a quidpro  quo  requirement  w-ill face  a sequence  of  budget 
constraints  rather  than  a single  present-value  constraint  over  all  time  as in  an  Arrow-Debreu 
economy.*t 
Understanding  money  in  this  way,  as a social  institution  not  fully  comprehensible  from 
the  point  of  view  of  a single  individual,  leads  one  naturally  to  thinking  about  monetary 
problems  in  terms  of  externalities.  Individually  optimal  behavior  may  not  be  socially 
optimal.  External  effects  may  justify  policy  interventions.?’ 
Now  clearly  trust  is not  always  impossible.  In  some  circumstances-for  instance.  those 
involving  continuing  relationships-a  promise  to pay,  rather  than  immediate  payment,  may 
be  acceptable.  Goodhart  (1975)  makes  the  useful  distinction  here  between  media  of 
e=cchange-“those  assets,  or  claims,  whose  transfer  to the  seller  will  commonly  allow  a sale 
to proceed”-and  means  of paq’menr-for  which,  followin,  n the  exchange,  the  seller  considers 
19Money  can be seen as relaxing  the requirement  for a “real” quid pro quo:  it is a sort of “dummy” 
quid pro quo  that enables  trade  to be carried  out through  a sequence  of “half-barter”  transacuons  (,Koopmans, 
1933). 
*OCf. Gale  (1982)  who considers  a finite-horizon  model  in which  agents  receive  a sum of money  from 
the “planner”  at the beginning,  that must be returned  to him at the end: 
[Mloney  acts as a store  of information.  By arrangmg  appropriate  tmdcs  in money  the 
planner  can  keep  track  of  how much  each  agent  has got out of the system  in the past.  Agents 
would  like to pretend  they  were  someone  else but the terminal  constraint  on money  holdings 
prevents  them  from  doing  this advantageously.  Their  money  holdings  provide  just  enough 
information  to allow  the planner  to find out  who  they  arc;  but the striking  thing  is that he can 
only  do this if he treats  money  as if it had a uniform  market  price  and uses  it to “balance 
budgets”. . . 
The  existence  of money  provides  a kind of collateral.  To yet  goods  today  an agent  has to 
give  up money;  to get  his money  back  tomorrow  hc has to give  up goods.  [p 3271 
*lCf.  Gale  (1982,  p  189): 
Without  a sequence  of budget  constraints  there  is no need  for money  or any other  financirll 
asset.  The  absence  of trust explains  both  the need  for a sequence  of budget  constraints  and the 
difference  between  money  and its closest  substitutes.  In th1.s scnsc  and m the theory  of general 
equilibrium  it appears  to be the fundamental  distmguishing  charactcnstic  of money  as an asset 
In short,  in general  equilibrium  mod&,  the absence  of trust leads to a sequence  of budget 
constraints  which  leads  to the use of assets.  Money  is the asset  which  imposes  the least cost  of 
gathering  information  and,  in gcncral  equilibrium,  these  information  costs  must  be chiefly  the 
costs  of determinmg  the trustworthiness  (in the broadest  sense)  of the issuer  of the asset.  This 
disposes  of the question  of  why other  assets  will not do just  as well as money..  . 
*%his  view  of  money  as a social  mstitution  is close  to that of Simmcl-set  Laidlcr  and  Rowe  (1980) 11 
that  final  payment  has  been  made  for  the  sale  items  (a quidpru  quo has  actually  been 
received). 
Ln the  real  world,  it may  be  useful  to think  of  fiat  base  money  as being  definitive 
money,  the  unique  means  of  payment,  with  other  converribfe  moneys  (e.g.,  checkable 
deposits,  traveller  checks)  and  money  substitutes  (credit  cards)  representing  titles  to 
definitive  money  and  ways  of  transferring  title  to  it (see  Robertson,  1922,  and  Osborne, 
1984  and  1985).  The  use  of  convertible  moneys  and  money  substitutes  may  then  be 
understood  as ways  of  economizing  on  the  costly  holding  and  transfer  of  definitive  money. 
While  definitive  money  is unique  as a (non-barter)  means  of  payment,  checks,  credit  cards, 
trade  credit,  etc.,  are  all  media  of  exchange.23 
While  work  continues  on  the  microfoundations  of  finance  constraints,  it seems  safe  to 
say  that  these  microfoundations  have  been  fairly  well  established.  The  question  then  arises 
of  how  much  of  these  microfoundations  to bring  into  a particular  model. 
It is now  fairly  widely  recognized  that  it is desirable  to build  models  “from  the  ground 
up,”  beginning  with  tastes  and  technology,  rather  than  specifying  ad hoc functions  or 
restrictions  (e.g.,  arbitrarily  rigid  wages).  Some  work  using  finance  constraints  has  been 
criticized  as being  ud  hoc  in this  sense:  although  the  microfoundations  exist  in  principle, 
they  are  not  spelled  out  in the  model.  The  question,  of  course,  is how  structural  does  the 
model  need  to be  for  a given  purpose  ?  While  it is clear  that  one  could  always  start  from  the 
basic  asymmetric  information  problem,  the  result  would  generally  be cumbersome  and 
unwieidy.  For  many  purposes,  especially  positive  ones-for  instance,  exhibiting  the  macro 
properties  of  a finance-constrained  economy-it  seems  quite  legitimate  to begin  with  finance 
constraints,  knowing  that  the  structural  story  is  there  in the  background.  For  other 
purposes,  particularly  normative  ones  (a good  example  is the  optimum  quantity  result 
discussed  below  in  Section  1V.Q  the  full  structure  needs  to be  there  from  the  beginning. 
The  key,  of  course,  is whether  or  not  possible  endogenous  changes  in  the  name  of  the 
finance  constraints  may  affect  the  validity  of  the  results. 
23Gorton  (1987)  looks  at media  of exchange  other  than definitive  money  as contracts.  He then asks 
what properties  are required  of convertible  moneys  in order  for them to represent  enforceable  contracts. 12 
IV. MONETARY  THEORY 
A.  The  demand  for  money 
The demand  for money,  the supply  of money,  and the “market  for money”  are the 
central  theoretical  constructs  of the liquidity  preference  theory.  Explaining  and estimating 
demand,  and understanding  and measuring  supply,  are at the top of its research  agenda.2” 
For the finance  constraint  theory,  however,  money-holding  behavior  is not of the same 
major  importance.  Money  is understood  in terms of itsfincrion  rather  than  in terms  of its 
quantity,  and,  from  this point  of view,  the “market  for money”  analogy  does  not turn out 
not to be particularly  useful.  As a result,  finance  constraint  models  often  specify  money- 
holding  behavior  in a fairly  crude  way.25 
To understand  the basic difference  between  the two approaches,  consider  their 
respective  treatments  of the relationship  between  expenditure  and the holding  of money. 
For the liquidity  preference  theory,  the holding  of money  is primary-the  object  of an active 
decision  by agents  on how much  of their wealth  to hold  in this form.  If agents  wish  to 
hold  more  or less than  they  actually  possess,  expenditure  will  fall or rise in response  (the 
“real balance  effect”).  For the finance  constraint  theory,  on the other  hand,  it is expenditure 
that is primary:  the holding  of money  is a secondary  consequence  of decisions  about  sales 
and purchases.  Agents  will  hold enough  money  to enable  them  to carry  out their  trading 
plans,  and their  attempts  to acquire  more  money  for this purpose,  or dispose  of  the excess, 
will affect  asset prices.  Money  received  in exchange  for sales, rather  than  being 
“demanded”  as a portfolio  investment,  is passively  “accepted”  pending  future  disposal. 
Indeed,  in simple  finance  constraint  models  (like  the one of Section  II) there  is 110  demand 
for money  as an asset; in more complicated  models,  a precautionary  or speculative  demand 
can be engineered,  but it is a wrinkle,  not the centerpiece  as it is in the liquidity  preference 
theory.26 
24Seeing  the primary  purpose  of monetary  theory  as being  the basis for the aggregate  money  demand 
equation-just  as investment  theory  is the basis for the aggregate  investment  function,  and consumer  theory 
for the aggregate  consumption  function-is  part of a general  Keynesian  approach  to macroeconomics  that is 
increasingly  losing  favor. 
25This  view  of money  also  suggests  that data on money  Ilows  may  be more  interesting  than those  on 
money  stocks.  Copeland’s  (1947,  1952) study  of  “moneyflows”  was motivated  by just  such  a view. 
Although  the current  flow-of-funds  data are restricxd  to financial  tlows,  Copeland  had originally  hoped  to 
capture  empirically  the whole  circular  flow of money  payments  through  the economy.  This  attempt  found 
itself orphaned  as the liquidity  preference  theory  became  predominant. 
26See Chick  (1987)  on the distinction  between  a voluntary  demand  for money  and the passive 
acceptance  of  it, and on Hicks’ own  recent  doubts  on whether  or not the “demand  for money”  is a valid 
description  of money-holding  behavior.  The  distinction  between  the demand  for money  and the passive 
acceptance  of it, was, of course,  at the heart of Tsiang’s (1966)  resolution  of the liquidity- 
preferencelloanable-funds  controversy. 13 
Money,  then,  is held  primarily  for  transactions  purposes.  The  dollar  amount  held,  as 
noted  by  Robertson  (1938)  and  Tsiang  (1966),  is related  to the  dollar  value  of  planned 
expenditure.  Only  in the  long  run,  in a stationary,  closed  economy,  is this  equivalent  to  the 
liquidity  preference  formulation  of  a demand  for  real  balances  dependent  on  real  output  or 
real  wealth  (see  Tsiang,  1977,  and  Grossman  and  Weiss,  1983). 
In  an  open  economy,  money  will  be  held  to finance  imports  and  exports.  Even  when 
foreign  uade  is balanced,  changes  in the  volume  of  trade  may  affect  the  relation  between 
total  transactions  and  income  (Tsiang,  1977,  shows  empirical  evidence  of  such  effects  for 
Taiwan).  1McKinnon  (1979)  has  remarked  on  the  importance  of  the  choice  of  currency  of 
invoice  and  of  financing  practices,  and  Townsend  (1983)  and  Helpman  and  Razin  (1985) 
have  explored  some  of  the  implications  in formal  finance  constraint  models. 
The  old  question  of  the  empirical  importance  of  money  held  for  financial  transactions 
(Keynes’  “financial  circulation,”  1930)  has  recently  been  reopened  by  Field  (198%  b), 
who  argues  persuasively  that  the  increased  volume  of  financial  transactions  in  the 
speculation  of  1929  had  an  important  role  in raising  real  interest  rates  and  in  bringing  on  the 
Crash. 
A number  of  recent  studies  lend  support  to  the  finance  constraint  view  of  money- 
holding  behavior.  Empirical  estimates  of  the  aggregate  dem&a.nd  for  money,  the  central 
construct  of  the  liquidity  preference  theory,  have  proven  to  be highly  unstable  since  the 
early  1970s  and  the  associated  econometrics  has  come  increasingly  under  fire  (Cooley  and 
LeRoy,  198 1;  Goodfriend,  1985).  In  particular,  Goodfriend  argues  that  the  usual 
explanation  of  the  presence  of  a lagged  left-hand  variable  in empirical  money  demand 
equations  as representing  portfolio  adjustment  is quite  implausible.  He  suggests  instead 
that  it is an  artifact-evidence  of  measurement  error  in the  right-hand  variables,  particularly 
in GNP  as  a measure  of  transactions.  Osborne  and  Overdahl(1987)  construct  a time  series 
for  private  spending  and  use  it to calculate  a transactions  velocity  for  base  money.  They 
find  the  behavior  of  velocity  so  defined  to be  less  mysterious  than  the  conventionally 
defined  velocity  (Ml/GXP).  In particular,  they  find  the  drop  in velocity  in  the  Great 
Depression  to be  much  greater  for  their  measure  of  velocity,  suggesting  that  an  increase  in 
demand  (“scramble  for  cash”)  may  have  been  more  important,  relative  to  a drop  in  supply, 
than  had  previously  been  supposed.  Spindt  (1985)  has  developed  an  index  of  the  quantity 
of  money  using  turnover  rates  that  is much  better  behaved  than  standard  Ml. 
The  relation  between  individual  holdings  of  money  and  planned  expenditure  is 
considerably  more  complex  than  su,,  ODested by the  simple  model  of  Section  II.  This 
emerges  clearly  from  the  work  of  Akerlof  (1979,  1982)  and  Clower  and  Howitt  (1978). 
Average  money  holdings  depend  on  “autonomous  payments”-income  and  expenditure 14 
flows  into  and out of money  balances-and  on the monitoring  rule that determines  “induced 
payments”  to keep  money  holdings  in the desired  range.  Akerlof  shows  that under  a range 
of plausible  monitoring  rules,  average  holdings  may be relatively  insensitive  in the short 
run to changes  in the volume  of autonomous  payments  and to changes  in interest  rates. 
Clower  and Howitt  (1978)  show  that small changes  in the scheduling  of payments  and 
receipts  can  have large consequences  for equilibrium  money  holdings  (reviving  an 
important  theme  in the work  of Angell,  1937, and Ellis,  1938).  h4ilboume  (1983)  argues 
that trade credit  may  be much  more  important  than the plain  numbers  suggest  precisely 
because  it may  allow  greater  freedom  in scheduling  payments,  with a consequently  large 
reduction  in required  holdings  of money.27 
The simple  cash-in-advance  model  implies  a constant  velocity  of money  of one per 
period  We should,  of course,  distinguish  here  (with  Keynes,  1930) between  the circuir 
velocity,  the speed at which  money  actually  spent circulates,  and the e$~rive  velocity,  a 
weighted  average  of the circuit  velocity  of money  that is spent and of zero, the “circuit 
velocity”  of money  that is twf spent in the period.  It is the circuit  velocity  that is fixed  at 
unity  in the simple  model.  Once  we provide  agents  with a reason  to hold  money  in excess 
of planned  expenditures-precautionary  holdings  as in Lucas  (1980,  1984), Helpman 
(1981a),  and Svensson  (1985b),  or speculative  holdings  as in Kohn  (AD)-the  effective 
velocity  can vary  even  if the circuit  velocity  remains  unchanged.  Another  way  to get away 
from  a fu<ed effective  velocity  is to make  the length  of the transactions  period  endogenous 
(see,e.g.,  Fried,  1973;  Clower  and  Howitt,  1978;  Jovanovic,  1982;  and  Leach,  1983). 
There  is a clear distinction  in finance  constraint  models  between  individual  holdings  of 
money  and aggregate  holdings.  Changes  in the latter may  be the result  of changes  in inter- 
agent  flows  rather  than of changes  in any individual  desire  to hold  money.*s  Akerlof 
(1978)  illustrates  this possibility  in a model  in which  changes  in flows  between  tightly  and 
loosely  monitored  accounts  result  in changes  in aggregate  holdings  even  when  individual 
monitoring  rules  remain  the same. 29 Kohn  and Karacaoglu  (1989)  show  that in an open 
economy  of heterogeneous  individuals  with interest-inelastic  transactions  demands  for 
money  there can be an aggregate  money  demand  function  of the conventional  type that 
27The role  of trade  credit  as a possible  substitute  for money  is a delicate  and interesting  problem.  See 
also Brechling  and Lipscy  (1963),  Kohn  (1981a),  and Lucas  (1985). 
**Liang  (1980,  1984) argues  that money  “between”  owners  (various  types  of float)  makes  up, 
empirically,  an important  part of the total aggregate  amount,  and that this part may  behave  quite  differently 
from  holdings  voluntarily  held by individuals. 
2gIn Grossman  and Weiss  (1983)  too, flows between  heterogeneous  individuals  affect  aggregate 
holdings. 15 
appears  interest-elastic.  This  aggregate  money  demand  function,  however,  is not  structural 
in  the  sense  of  Lucas:  it will  not  predict  correctly  the  result  of  policy  experiments.30 
It is clear,  then,  for  both  theoretical  and  empirical  reasons,  that  there  are  serious 
problems  with  the  liquidity  preference  theory  and  its aggregative  analysis  of  a “market  for 
money”  based  on  a stable  aggregate  demand  function  for  money. 
An  interesting  attempt  at rehabilitation  is provided  by  the  “buffer  stock  approach” 
developed  by  Laidler  and  others  (see  Laidler,  1984,  and  Milbourne,  1987,  for  references) 
in  which  the  aggregate  demand  for  money  is restated  in  terms  of  microfoundations  very 
similar  to  those  of  the  finance  constraint  theory.  It is not  clear,  however,  that  this 
rehabilitation  is successful  (see  Milboume,l987),  or even  that  it is desirable:  it might  be 
better  to abandon  this  sort  of  aggregative  analysis  altogether.  The  following  discussion 
will,  I hope,  persuade  the  reader  that  useful  insights  may  be obtained  from  the  finance 
constraint  theory  directly,  without  restating  everything  in  terms  of  a market  for  money. 
B.  The  real  effects  of  inflation 
This  is an  area  in  which  the  finance  constraint  approach  has  been  particularly  f?uitfu1.31 
The  key  to  most  results  is the  time  wedge  between  sale  and  purchase.  Inflation  erodes  the 
value  of  money  held  or  owed  over  this  interval,  worsenin,  n the  individual’s  effective  terms 
of  trade,  and  pushing  him  towards  autarchy.  In other  words,  inflation  acts  as  a tax  on 
trade. 
The  long-run,  steady-state,  effects  of  this  tax  are  explored  by  Srockman  (198  I),  Leach 
(1983),  Kohn(  1984),  and  Rotemberg  (1984).  In contrast  to  the  standard  Tobin  and 
Mundell  effects,  the  capital  stock  falls,  employment  is reduced,  and  output  drop~.~*  The 
net  yield  on  capital  remains  equal  to the  rate  of  time  preference,  but  the  marginal  plr_vsicaL 
product  rises,  as  inflation  places  a wedge  between  the  two.  The  real  wage  falls,  and,  if 
labor  supply  is sufficiently  inelastic,  the  fall  is more  than  proportionate  to  the  tax. 
Because  of  the  fall  in output  (the  reduction  in economic  activity),  the  welfare  loss  to 
individuals  exceeds  the  “revenue”  of  the  tax.  Since  Leach  (1983)  deals  explicitly  with 
transactions  costs,  making  the  length  of  the  trading  period  endogenous,  he  is able  to  show 
that  this  welfare  loss  is quite  distinct  form  the  increase  in transaction  costs  that  corresponds 
j”  Lucas  (1987)  provides  a dcimsc ot‘  the  suucturality  of X~C~;~LI~C  money  dcm;md equations  based on 
a representative  individual  finance  consurunt model.  SuucturaIrty  does  not stem  to hold  up for models  with 
heterogeneous  individuals.  See. too, the discussion  below  (Section  VIA)  of the equivalence  of finance 
constraint  formulations  and  those  mvolving  money  in the utility  function. 
31The results  of the Hicks-Kcyncs  theory  are survcycd  in Fischer  (19S8). 
32Unless  investment  is financed  out of rctltincd  earnings.  so “evading”  the innation  1~1~:  see Stockman 
(1981).  Leach  (1983)  and Rotcmbcrg  ( 1’9S-1)  assume  this without  further  discussion. 16 
to the excess-burden  triangle  in the standard  treatment  of the inflation  tax on cash  balances. 
In a general  equilibrium,  comparative-tax  framework,  Leach  finds  the optimum  inflation  tax 
to be quite  small.33 
This  steady-state  analysis  is probably  not enough  in itself  for a satisfactory  explanation 
of the real effects  of inflation.  The  “tax rate” equals  the per-period  (say monthly)  inflation 
rate.  For Israel  or Argentina,  one could  see that a tax rate of 5-20%  (particularly  if 
uncertain)  might  have  substantial  effects,  but a rate of say  1% in the U.S. or Europe  hardly 
seems likely  to have  a major  impact. 
However,  if we combine  this “distortion”  with other  plausible  departures  from 
neoclassical  perfection,  larger  effects  can result.  For instance,  if capital  is slow  to adjust, 
an unanticipated  increase  in the rate of inflation  can depress  the net yield  on capital  below 
its long-run  level,  reducing  the market  value  of existing  capital  (see Kohn,  1984).34  If, in 
addition,  the real  wage is sticky,  this effect  on the yield  to capital  will be magnified  and 
there  will  also  be transitory  unemployment.  35 If the real wage  is sticky  enough, 
employment,  and perhaps  the capital  stock  as well,  may  fall below  their  long-run  steady- 
state values,  with output  falling  more  in the short run than  in the long.  These  short-run 
disequilibrium  effects  may  be substantial,  and they bear at least a glancing  resemblance  to 
the set of phenomena  jointly  labelled  “sngflation”  in the  1970s. 
Another  departure  from the standard  neoclassical  model  that amplifies  the effects  of the 
inflationary  distortion  is a non-stationary  increasing-returns  technology  of the type 
suggested  by Romer  (1986)  (see also  Kohn  and Wuion,  1987).  While  inflation  reduces 
the level of the capital  stock  in the standard  model,  in the non-stationary  model  it reduces  its 
rare ofgrowth  (see Rebello,  1987).  Hence,  even  low rates of the inflation  tax can  have 
large cumulative  effects  over time. 
The finance  constraint  approach  makes  it clear that the effects  of an inflation  will 
depend  critically  on how new money  enters  the economy  (an observation  that goes back to 
Mill  and Cantillon).  This  is true even in the sready srare (see Kohn,  1988a).  The 
substitution  effects  of the inflation  tax will always  be the same. but the total  impact  will 
depend  too on the income  effects-how  the “revenue”  of the tax is distributed.  T’his implies 
that questions  like,  “What  is the effect  of inflation  on real interest  rates?”  are not well 
33Moreover,  Lucas  and Stokey  (1983)  tind  the inflation  tax subject  to a time-consistency  problem  that 
does  not afflict  other  ta,xes. 
34An analogous  result  is found  by Day (1953)  for the unexpected  part of a random  inflation  in a 
ntional  expectations  framework. 
35Ma.linvaud (1977)  calls  such  unemployment,  associated  with a rise in labor costs  (caused  here  by the 
inflation  tax),  “Classical”  uncmploymcnt,  m contradistinction  to the  Keynesian  variety. 17 
formulated  until  it is specified  precisely  how the new money  enters  the economy.  Note that 
for the liquidity  preference  theory  only  the quanriry of money  matters:  it cannot  accept that 
the way money  enters  the economy  affects  the results.  If it did, two situations  with  the 
same quantity  would  not be equivalent.  However,  the finance  constraint  approach  naturally 
leads one to think  of money  as a distribution  device,  as part of the mechanism  allocating 
current  spending  among  individuals  and across  uses (for instance,  between  investment  and 
consumption).  Inflation  involves  the creation  of new purchasing  power,  and the way  this 
is distributed  will have effects  that are important  in determining  the overall  real impact  of 
the inflation. 
For example,  Kohn  (1988a)  shows  that the effect  of inflation  on the real rate of interest 
will differ  between  a government-deficit  inflation-the  new money  buys  goods  and boosts 
consumption-and  a credit  infla.tion-the  new money  is offered  as loans  and boosts  saving 
and investment.  The former  type of inflation  tends to raise real rates of interest,  the latter  to 
lower  them.36  A failure  to recognize  this distinction  led to serious  errors  in anticipating  the 
consequences  of disinflation  in the United  States  in the early  1980s.  Sargent  (1986), 
basing  his analysis  on a liquidity  preference  view  of the world,  saw no problem  in drawing 
lessons  from  disinflation  in other  counnies  in which  inflation  had been the result  of 
monetization  of government  deficits.  However,  in the U.S., the inflation  had largely  been 
the result  of a major  expansion  of bank credit caused  by a wave of financial  innovations: 
the government  printing  press had had little  to do with it.  While  in the case  studied  by 
Sargent,  the government-deficit  case, disinflation  tends to lorver real rates of interest  with 
expansionary  consequences,  in the credit-expansion  case disinflation  tends to raise real 
rates with  contractionary  consequences. 
Another  immediate  implication  of the careful  analysis  of different  types of monetary 
injection  is that perfect  indexation-perfect  in that it completely  neutralizes  the effects  of 
inflation-is  impossible.  The  income  and substitution  effects  of the inflation  can be 
precisely  offset  only  by paying  a yield  on money  exactly  equal  to the inflation  rate.  This 
requires  that all new money  enter  the economy  as indexation  payments.  So perfect 
indexation  is possible  only  in the trivial  case that the inflation  is caused  by, and only  by, the 
indexation  payments  themselves. 
The above  view  of the effects  of inflation  is much  closer  conceptually  to the “forced 
saving”  of pre-Keynesian  monetary  theory  than it is to the monetarist  inflation  tax on cash 
balances.  The inflation  tax on trade subverts  the basic function  of money-to  enforce 
361n general,  the “Fisher  relation”  ~111  not hold: see  Kouri  (1983)  and Krugman,  Persson,  and 
Svensson  (1985). 18 
honesty  by keeping  track of what  the individual  owes the system  and vice versa.  Because 
of the tax, the real value  of an individual’s  purchases  will be strictly  less that the real value 
of his sales.  Those  spending  the newly  created  money  that causes  the inflation  are 
“cheating”:  they do not established  entitlement  to the goods  they purchase  by supplying 
goods  of equal  value.3’ 
C.  The  optimum  quantity  of  money 
While  the question  of  the “optimum  quantity  of money,”  or, more  correctly,  the 
optimum  yield  on money,  is of dubious  practical  significance,  it constitutes  a sort of 
touchstone  for theories  of money,  involving,  as it does,  all the most difficult  and delicate 
issues of modelling  and interpretation.  A theory  that gives  a satisfactory  answer  to this 
question  may  inspire  greater  confidence  when  applied  to questions  of greater  practical 
importa.nce.38 
The basic  Monetarist  result-the  “Friedman  rule” as it is often  called-suggests  that 
individuals  should  be “satiated”  with real balances.  Real balances  provide  utility:  they  are 
seen both as a productive  input  in the implicit  technolo,T  of exchange  and as a 
precautionary  asset, providing  insurance  against  constrained  spending.  Since  the marginal 
social  cost of their creation  is essentially  zero, their marginal  utility  to individuals  should  be 
driven  to zero too by making  the opportunity  cost of holding  them  nil.  This  can  be done 
either  by paying  interest  on money  (financed  by taxes. so that the price level  remains 
constant)  or by engineering  a detlation  to make the nominal  rate of interest  zero (by 
imposing  a tax and not spending  the proceeds).39 
Dissatisfaction  with this result  was a major  stimulus  to the development  of the finance 
constraint  theory.  To many  critics  (Tsian g, 1969; Clower,  1970; Hahn,  197 l),  it seemed 
fundamentally  implausible:  it promised  something  for nothing  when  perhaps  the deepest 
intuition  in economics  is that there  is no free lunch.  Given  this criticism,  the extent  to 
37See  Kohn  (1984)  for more  on forced  saving.  Forced  saving  was usually  associated  with  inflations 
caused  by credit  expansion  (inside  money)  rather  than with government  dciictt  inflations. 
38Cf.  Clower  (1970,  p 33): 
The  question  of  monetary  optimality,  like most questions  in welfare  economics,  is 
important  not so much  for  its own  sake as for the stimulus  it has given  to monetary  theorists  to 
re-examine  the foundations  and strengthen  the superstructure  of their subject..  . 
Perhaps  we shall  never  have  a definitive  answer  to the optimality  problem,  but we shall 
certainly  have  many  attempts  at it.  And in the process  we shall  get what  is  most  urgently 
needed:  an improved  thcorctical  understanding  of the actual  working  of he economy  in which  we 
live. 
3g0f  course,  as noted  by Grandmont  and Younes  (1973),  paying  interest  on money  with  new money 
achieves  nothing.  It merely  causes  inflation  at a rate equal  to the rate of  interest  on money  and has no real 
effect  whatsoever:  the real yield  on money  is unaffected  (compare  the discussion  of “perfect  indexation” 
above).  Also  taxes  must be lump-sum,  or one  distortion  is being  traded  for another.  Leach  (1983) 
suggests,  however,  that modification  of the Friedman  rule because  of non-lump-sum  taxes  is not large. 19 
which  the result  has been upheld  in finance  constraint  models  is somewhat  surprising  and 
perhaps  disappointing.  So if the result  is wrong,  what is wrong  with  it?  The  finance 
constraint  approach  does  at least suggest  some answers. 
As noted  in Section  III, finance  constraints  create  a “distortion.”  They  imply  a time 
wedge  between  sale and purchase,  and, for individuals  exhibiting  time  preference,  this  “iax 
on trade” affects  subjective  relative  prices.  This  distortion  may  be removed  by reducing  to 
zero the opportunity  cost of holding  money.  This result  is implicit  in most  finance 
constraint  models,  but is central  in the papers  of Wilson  (1979),  Rotemberg  (1983), 
Svensson  (1985b)40,  and  Woodford  (1985,  1987). 
A paper by Townsend  is particularly  illuminating  here.  It compares  three different 
trading  regimes:  a) autarchy;  b) money-mediated  decentralized  exchange  involving  a cash- 
in-advance  constraint;  c) “centralized  trade credit”  that enables  exchange  without  a quidpro 
quo.  Regime  (b) improves  on (a) because  of the gains from  trade; regime  (c) improves  on 
(b) because  it removes  the time-wedge  distortion.  But remember  the discussion  of the 
microfoundations  of the finance  constraint  in Section  III.  Finance  constraints  are the 
market  solution  to a set of informational  problems.  Regime  (c)just  ussumes  that 
centralized  credit  can improve  upon the market  and solve these informational  problems  at 
zero cost.  The  welfare  gain from removing  the time-wedge  distortion  (through  centralized 
credit  or through  an appropriate  yield  on money)  comes  from assuming  away  the basic 
problem  that the finance  constraint  is there to solve. 
A part of the monetarist  rationale  for the optimum  quantity  result is that “false 
economy”  in holding  real  balances  leads  to excessive  real transactions  costs  (e.g., trips to 
the bank,  “shoe leather  costs”).  The finance  constraint  literature  has done  much  to make 
this  idea  more  precise.  Papers  by Fried  (1973),  Jovanovic  ( 1982), and  Leach  ( 1983) ail 
derive  the transactions  structure  (essentially  the length of the trading  period  over  which  the 
finance  constraint  applies)  by explicit  optimization  with respect to transaction  costs,  the 
yield  on money  being  one of those costs.  They  all find that real transactions  costs  are 
minimized  by the Friedman  rule.  As Clower  (1969)  was first to note,  however,  tr;lde 
involves  inventories  of more  than just  money.  Non-convex  transaction  costs  imply  that the 
goods  to be sold will be accumulated  for discrete  sales and that consumption  will be made 
out  of inventories  replenished  at discrete  intervals.  Total  transactions  costs  are minimized 
by the proper  management  of all  these inventories  considered  together  (Glower,  1970, and 
Clower  and Howitt,  1978).  The yield  on one  type of inventory  will  affect  the holdings  of 
4oSvensson’s  optimum  quantity  rule  is acctually more  complex,  as it applies  to an economy  with 
random  shocks  to money  and output.  However,  its basis is the same and it reduces  to the Friedman  rule  in 
a deterministic  stationary  state. 20 
all types  in ways  that are quite  complex.  Hewitt  (1988) considers  a model  with 
middlemen,  in which  individual  decisions  about inventories  and trading  frequencies  impose 
a non-pecuniary  externality  on the middlemen.  As a result of this externality,  the simple 
optimum  quantity  result  does  not in general  hold  . 
The  second  part of the Monetarist  rationale  for the Friedman  rule rests on the role  of 
real  balances  as a precautionary  asset.  Take  a model  in which  the only  constraint  on 
individuals’  transactions  is a present-value  budget constraint  over  time  (the standard  “non- 
monetary”  model).  Now  add a sequence  of finance  constraints.  Unless  the additional 
constraints  are never  binding,  welfare  must be reduced  by their  introduction.  Now reverse 
the procedure.  Start with  a model  in which  agents  face a sequence  of finance  constraints. 
Make  a change  that ensures  that the sequence  of constraints  is non-binding.  Voila! 
Welfare  is improved. 
This  is precisely  what happens  when  individuals  are “satiated”  with real balances  (see 
Ostroy,  1973).  Grandmont  and  Younes  (1973)  and  Krugman,  Persson,  and  Svensson 
(1984)  base their results  on this  sort of argument. 41 The  latter paper recognizes  that 
satiation  is equivalent  to the existence  of a perfect capital  market-that  is, equivalent  to 
individuals  facing  only  a present-value  budget constraint.“*  But remember  the trust 
problem:  there  is a reason  for the sequence  of finance  constraints;  nullifying  them  may  not 
be a terribly  good idea.  What  seems best for the individual,  may  not be best for the 
system,  may  not even  be feasible  for the system.“3 
All the optimality  results  are achieved  either  by removing  the frictions  that justify 
monetary  exchange  in the first place  or by ignoring  that these frictions  imply  a second-best 
world.  As Hahn  (1971)  has noted: 
The  necessary  conditions  for Pareto-efficiency  in the world of uncertainty 
with intertemporal  choice  will in general  be fulfilled  in  a market  economy  only  if 
money  plays  no role.  There  are therefore  no grounds  for supposing  that the 
Friedman  rule is either  necessary  or sufficient  for Pareto-efficiency  since it is of 
411n both  cases,  money  is the only  asset  in the model,  so that individuals  are really  satiated  with USSP~S 
rather  than  specifically  with  money.  In Krugman,  Persson,  and Svensson,  while  there  is another  asset, 
trade  in it takes place  only  between  pcnods;  when goods  markcu  arc open.  individuals  are constrained  by 
cash alone.  As Bewley  (1980.  1983) and Rotemberg  (1984)  have  hotetf,  houevcr.  no finite  level  of assets 
may  be sufficient  to achieve  such  satiation. 
42Hahn  (1965,  1982) has called  this type  of sequence  economy  inessential:  see also L’lph and Ulph 
(1977). 
43Tsiang  (1969)  was the first  to criticize  the “satiation”  idea on these  sorts  of grounds-on  the grounds 
of externalities.  His argument  focused  on the implications  for stability  m the face of external  shocks.  How 
stable  would  prices  be if individuals  all had access  to unlimited  purchasing  power? 21 
the  essence  of  an explanation  for  the  existence  of money  that  other  conventional 
necessary  conditions  are  violated. 
There  seems  reason  to believe  that  the  Friedman  rule  will  not  hold  up  when  all the 
“imperfections”  are  properly  spelled  out.  Papers  by  Hellwig  (1982),  Bewley  (1983),  and 
Illing  (1985)  consider  the  problem  in models  that  start  from  the  fundamental  informational 
problem  that justifies  the  existence  of  fmance  constraints.  They  find  in  this  context  that  the 
Friedman  rule  is infeasible  if the  government,  in levying  the  necessary  taxes,  is  subject  to 
the  same  informational  problems  as other  agents.  Illing  finds  that  the  monitoring  costs 
imposed  by  an  income  tax  will  nullify  any  benefits.  Bewley  and  Hellwig  find  that  a true 
lump-sum  tax  will  require  individuals  to  increase  their  holdings  of  money  by  enough  to 
ensure  their  ability  to pay  the  tax:  but  then  the  interest  on  rhese money  balances  must  be 
the  government  pays,  leaving  it with  insufficient  revenue  to pay  interest  on  the  original 
money  balances-a  contradiction. 
D.  Self-generating  inflation 
all 
Another  disturbing  property  of  liquidity  preference  models  of  money  is their  propensity 
for  “self-generating  inflation”-a  dynamic  path  along  which  the  price  level  grows  (or  falls) 
explosively  even  though  the  quantity  of  money  does  not  change.4  Formally,  the  model 
possesses  equilibria  in which  there  are  mutually  consistent  paths  of  expectations  of  rising 
prices  and  of  actually  rising  prices.  Agents  expect  inflation  and  their  response  to  this 
expectation  produces  a rise  in  prices  that  sustains  expectations  of  further  inflation,  and  so 
on.  This  happens  even  though  there  is no  monetary  accommodation.  In rational- 
expectations  or  perfect-foresight  formulations,  the  actual  inflation  produced  exactly  equals 
the  inflation  expected. 
The  models  that  first  were  found  to exhibit  this  sort  of  self-generating  inflation  were  of 
the  standard  liquidity  preference  type:  the  aggregate  demand  for real  balances  is a function 
of  real  output  (usually  assumed  constant)  and  of  the  opportunity  cost  of  holding  money. 
The  latter  is generally  taken  to be  the  rate  of  inflation:  the  real  rare of  interest  is taken  to be 
constant  or “small”  relative  to  the  rate  of  inflation.  The  actual  price  level  is determined  by 
“equilibrium  in  the  market  for  money”:  the  supply  of  real  balances  (the  given  nominal 
money  supply  divided  by  the  price  level)  is brought  into  equality  with  demand  through 
movement  of  the  price  level. 
‘@Hicks himself  (1935)  was concerned  about  instability  due to self-fulfilling  expectations  in asset 
markets,  including  the “market  for money”  (see Laidler,  1986b).  The phenomenon  was discussed  at length 
by Goldman  (1972),  who also  showed,  even  more  bizarre,  that self-generating  inflation  can  be halted  by 
increasing  the rate of growth  of money. 22 
There are two types of reaction  to this result.  Some  take it seriously  and believe  that 
there is indeed  an inherent  fragility  to the continued  existence  of a monetary  system  of 
exchange.  They  are puzzled  why in practice  there  seems to be no empirical  evidence  of 
actual  self-generating  inflations.  Others,  believing  the empirical  evidence,  regard  the result 
rather  as an indication  that there  is something  wrong  with the theory. 
What  could  be wrong?  Some possibilities:  the theory  is ag,mgative  and not grounded 
in explicit  optimizing  behavior  in a general  equilibrium  model;  it treats money  purely  as an 
asset,  ignoring  money’s  role  as medium  of exchange;  there  is no explicit  consideration  of 
the mechanism  by which  price expectations  are turned  into actual  price movements. 
The  first possibility  turns out not to matter.  It is easy  to set up optimizing  models  that 
have  the same properties-for  instance,  overlapping  generations  models  of the type 
developed  by Wallace  (1980). 
The  second  possibility  too, matters  less than one  might  have  thought.  As Woodford 
(1986a)  notes,  it is not that easy  to separate  the transactions  demand  of finance  constraint 
models  from  the speculative  demand  of liquidity  preference  models:  “[It] is difficult  to 
identify  analytically  a purely  speculative  component  of either  the demand  for cash  balances 
or of the equilibrium  value  of money,  a  uiven  that even  the demand  for transactions  purposes 
is surely  dependent  upon expectations  regarding  the rate at which  money  appreciates  or 
depreciates  in value  while  held.”  Woodford  sets up a model  with infinitely-lived  agents  and 
a cash-in-advance  constraint  that is formally  isomorphic  to the Wallace  overlapping- 
generations  model,  so that the conditions  for the existence  of self-generating  inflation  are 
the same  in the two models.45 
The  third  possible  source of difficulty,  problems  with specifying  the mechanism  of 
price  formation,  has several  levels. 
First, if we retain  for the moment  the quantity-theoretic  idea that the price  level  is just 
the rate of spending  divided  by the rate of output,  then expectations  of inflation  can cause 
actual  inflation  either  by increasing  spending  or by reducing  output.  Finance  constraint 
models  are quite  explicit  about  the connection  between  money  and spending.  They  suggest 
three distinct  ways  in which  expected  inflation  might  raise  the rate of spending. 
45 Woodford  (1986a.  p. 13)concludes: 
It seems,  then  incorrect  to claim  that there  ts a coherent  “fundamentalist  view”  of the value 
of  fiat  money  that contrasts  with  the  “bubbly  view”.  If one  is to assign  an unambiguous 
meaning  to the “market  fundamental”  of intrinsically  useless  fiat money,  it must equal  zero. 
Hence  the overlapping  generations  model  of money  yields  a valid  insight  into  how  it is possible 
for fiat money  to be valued  in a perfect  foresight  equilibrium.  even  if one  believes  that a realistic 
model  of money  must take  into account  the transactional  advantages  that money  enjoys  over 
other  assets. 23 
(1) Given  trading  practices  (length  of  the  trading  period,  bunching  of  purchases, 
monitoring  rules  for  cash  balances)  there  is a certain  amount  of  slack  in  the  system  in the 
form  of  “idle  balances”-money  held  as an  asset  beyond  the  amount  needed  for  planned 
expenditures.  Expected  inflation  leads  to  a reduction  or elimination  of  this  slack. 
However,  since  the  slack  is finite,  it is easy  to  show  that  the  consequent  rise  in  prices  is 
bounded  (Grossman  and  Weiss,  1983).  A continuing  self-generating  inflation  cannot  be 
generated  in  this  way. 
(2) Given  the  length  of  the  basic  trading  period,  purchases  can  be  bunched  nearer  to  the 
beginning  of  the  period.  If the  trading  periods  of different  individuals  are  staggered  in  time 
rather  than  synchronized,  money  can  then  complete  the  circular  flow  more  quickly, 
sustaining  a higher  rate  of  spending,  and  so  higher  prices.  However,  here  too  the  possible 
consequent  rise  in  prices  is bounded  (Kohn,  1981a). 
(3) ihe  length  of  the  basic  trading  period  itself  can  be  shortened  and  monitoring  rules 
changed.  Since  there  are  non-trivial  costs  to making  such  changes,  they  will  come  in 
discrete  jumps  (e.g.,  going  from  monthly  to  biweekly  paydays),  once  expected  inflation 
crosses  some  threshold  level  (Barre,  1970).  As  Akerlof  (1982)  has  shown,  the  potential 
gains  from  adjusting  optimal  monitoring  rules  to even  quite  large  changes  in the 
opportunity  cost  of  holding  money  can  be  trivial.  Also,  although  a shortened  trading 
period  will  increase  the  rate  of  spendin  g, it may  also  increase,  at least  temporarily,  the  rate 
at which  output  is being  brought  to market.  Nonetheless,  despite  these  good  reasons  for 
doubting  the  empirical  plausibility  of  this  third  mechanism,  there  is no  reason  in principle 
why  a self-generating  inflation  could  not  be  sustained  in  this  way. 
In addition  to these  effects  on  the  spending  side,  there  can  be effects  on  the  output  side. 
For  example,  in  a model  considered  by  Woodford  (1986a)  the  anticipated  “inflation  tax”  on 
labor  income  can  cause  a reduction  in  labor  supplied  sufficient  to validate  the  expected 
inflation. 
Of  course,  if we  limit  increases  in spending  by ruling  out  changes  in the  length  of  the 
trading  period  and  limit  reductions  in output  by  assumin, (J it to  be supplied  inelastically, 
then  explosive  self-generating  inflations  can  be ruled  out.46 
However,  self-generating  price  movements  need  not  be explosive.  Of  course,  in  linear 
models  of  the  type  usually  considered  in the  liquidity  preference  literature,  the  only 
alternative  to  stable  prices  is explosive  intlation  or  implosive  detlntion.  But  with  non-linear 
models,  there  may  exist  equilibrium  paths  with  self-generatin,  u (rational  expectations)  price 
46Fanner( 1984b)  obtains  a similar  result  in an overlapping  gencmtions  model  by assuming  exogenous 
output  and a minimum  unit of  uadcd  output.  The  latter,  like the bound  on period  length  in a finance 
constraint  model,  places  an upper  bound  on velocity. 24 
movements  that converge  to stable prices  or that vary  only  within  a bounded  range  (see 
Woodford,  1987c, inter  da).  To obtain  this kind  of equilibrium,  what is needed  is that a 
change  in expectations  regarding  the future value  of the price level cause  an even  greater 
change  in its current  equilibrium  value.  This  sort of strong  feedback  is possible  in a 
general  equilibrium  model  only  if the price mechanism  is prevented  from functioning  as it 
would  in a perfectly  competitive  economy  with complete  markets.  Overlapping  generations 
models  have  the required  “incompleteness,”  but, as Woodford  (1986a)  argues,  so do 
infinitely-lived-individual  models  with finance  constraints.  So far from ruling  out self- 
generating  price  movements,  finance  constraints  may  prove  sufficient  for their existence. 
This  brings  us back again  to the instantaneous  quantity-theoretic  determination  of the 
price level.  WilI  self-generating  movements  in spending  necessarily  imply  self-generating 
movements  in the price  level ?  If we think  of agents  actually  setting  prices,  then  we must 
ask whether  it is reasonable  (a) that agents  share an expectation  of future  inflation  and (b) 
that they  immediately  incorporate  this shared expectation  into prices.  This  sort of behavior 
is not implausible  for true asset markets-the  stock market  or the market  for gold,  say-in 
which  the relevant  price  is directly  observable  on a more or less continuous  basis,  but is it 
reasonable  for money,  the  “price” of which  is (the inverse  of) the general  level  of prices? 
The Lucas  island  model,  for example,  is based precisely  on the premise  that it is hard for 
agents  to identify  general  from  specific  price movements. 
However,  there  do seem to have  been historic  episodes  in which  price-setting  did 
satisfy  the two conditions  above,  (a) and (b), necessary  for self-generating  movements  to 
occur  in the price  of money.  For example,  LMerkin  (1982) argues  that, in the final 
explosive  stages of the German  hyperinflation,  prices  were rising  so fast that price-setters 
were led to use the exchange  rate as an indicator  of the general  price level.  Falls in the rate 
of exchange  were thus immediately  incorporated  into  higher  goods  prices,  and rising  prices 
served  further  to depress  the exchange  rate.  He argues  that by this stage  the expansion  of 
the money  supply  was largely  passive  and that, in any event,  it lagged  behind  the rise in 
prices.  The resulting  shortage  of real balances  (means  of payment)  acted  through  finance 
constraints  to limit  significantly  the actual volume  of real transactions  in the economy. 
E.  Pegging  interest  rates  and  the  determinacy  of  the  price-level 
What  happens  when  the central  bank  pegs the rate of inrerest?  This question  is of 
considerable  practical  importance,  because peggin,  * the rate of interest  seems  to be precisely 
what central  banks  do in the real  world.  Indeed,  given  the difficulty  of controlling,  or even 25 
defining,  monetary  aggregates  in a modern  economy  with  sophisticated  financial 
institutions,  it is not  clear  what  else  they  could do.47 
The  liquidity  preference  theory  suggests  that  what  central  banks  appear  to  be doing  in 
practice  cannot  be done  in principle-that  a policy  of pegging  the  rate  of  interest  is not 
feasible  (see  McCallum,  1986).  Friedman  (1968),  for  example,  suggests  that  a policy  of 
easy  money  cannot  keep  the  nominal  rate  of  interest  low  indefinitely.  While  it can  lower  it 
initially,  in  the  long  run,  as the  resulting  inflation  comes  to be expected,  the  interest  rate 
must  rise  to incorporate  an  inflation  premium.  (This  would  seem  to imply  that  if the 
inflation  is fully  anticipated  from  the  outset,  easy  money  cannot  lower  the  rate  of  interest 
even  temporarily.)  The  only  way  to  sustain  a low  nominal  rate  of  interest  is with  tight 
money  and  the  resulting  deflation. 
Other  work  has  suggested  infeasibility  in a different  sense.  The  rate  of  interest  can  be 
pegged,  but,  if it is, the  price  level  is indeterminate.  Modigliani  (1944)  was  the  first  to  note 
that  pegging  the  interest  rate  left  the  Keynesian  system  under-determined;4*  Pat&in 
(1965),  too,  found  the  price  level  to be  indeterminate  in the  case  of  a pure  inside-money 
economy  when  the  central  bank  peb3  Oued the  rate  of  interest;  and  the  same  result  is obtained 
in  standard  textbook  models  (e.g.,  Sargent,  1979,  pp  92-5)  and  in  stochastic  rational 
expectations  versions  of  the  Keynesian  model  (e.g.,  Sargent  and  Wallace,  1975).@ 
McCallum  (1986)  sees  this  indeterminacy  as a substantive  economic  problem:  “A 
‘pure  interest  rate  peg’  does  not...  constitute  a well-formulated  monetary  policy..  . .  [A] 
commitment  by  the  monetary  authority  to peg  [the  rate  of  interest]  at [a fixed].  . . value..  . is 
not  a satisfactory  description  of  policy  behavior....  [It  is]  not  complete  enough  to enable 
private  agents  to  form  expectations-themselves  crucial  for  asset  demand  behavior-in  a 
rational  manner”  (~148).  McCallum  quotes  Patinkin  ( 1965,  p309):  “a necessary  condition 
for  the  determinacy  of  the  absolute  price  level...  is that  the  central  bank  concern  itself  with 
some  money  value-and  in  this  sense  be  willing  to  suffer  from  money  illusion.” 
j7Saying  this,  that interest  rates  are the only  practical  insfrumenr  ot’ monct~y  policy,  is quite  different, 
of course,  from  saying  that  interest  rates,  say  low or stable  intcrcst  rate.s. should  be its goal:  even  if the 
goal  is taken  to be price  stability,  say. a policy  of adjusting  the interest  rate  in response  to inflationary  or 
deflationary  pressure  might  be the only  fcaslble  one;  the “quantuy  OC  money”  might  not be controllable 
directly. 
48He suggested,  incorrectly,  that this justified  Keynes’s claim  that I~qtudi~y  preference  could  lead LO 
unemployment  equilibrium  even  in Lhe  cast  oi a tlexible  money  wage.  Set  Kohn  (,  1% I b) for further 
discussion. 
4gSargent  and Wallace  (1982)  describe  an optimizing,  nthcr  than an aggegative,  model  that does  not 
exhibit  this type  of indeterminacy  and ascribe  the absence  ot’ the phenomenon.  in conuast  to its presence  in 
their  1975 paper,  precisely  to their  now employing  an optimizing  model.  However,  as McCallum  (1986) 
notes,  in the  1982 paper  they  peg  both  the rate OC  interest  and  the quantity  of money,  so that the resulting 
detcrminacy  of  the price  level  is not really  counter  LO  their  1975 result. 26 
The basic problem  with using  the liquidity  preference  theory  to understand  the effects 
of pegging  the rate of interest  is that it is not easy  within  its framework  to describe  what 
actually  happens  when  this is done.  The  liquidity  preference  theory  is a static  theory  of 
portfolio  (stock)  equilibrium,  and is thus inherently  unsuited  to describing  the dynamics 
and flows  involved  in pegging  the rate of interest  away  from  its equilibrium  level. 
The  finance  constraint  theory,  on the other  hand,  is practically  tailor-made  for the 
purpose.  According  to it, investment  expenditure  requires  the outlay  of money;  the 
loanable  funds  market  is where  investors  borrow  the required  money  from  savers;  and the 
rate of interest  is the price  at which  this borrowing  takes place.  If the rate of interest  is 
pegged  below  its equilibrium  level,  say, there  will be a flow excess  demand  for loans  of 
money.  The central  bank  will  have  to satisfy  this flow  excess  demand  by lending  money  it 
creates  for the purpose.  The requisite  flow  of new money  is perfectly  well  defined,  and the 
price  level,  therefore,  is quite  determinate.  Because  of the flow  of new money  into  the 
economy,  the price  level  will be rising,  but at any moment  of time it will  be perfectly 
determinate. 
While  Wicksell,  in his discussion  of the  “cumulative  process,”  was the first to articulate 
this view  of the connection  between  money-creation  and the rate of interest,  he failed  to 
provide  a satisfactory  formal  model. 50 The  first to do so was Robertson  (1934)  who 
improved  on Wicksell’s  description  of the cumulative  process,  particularly  with  respect  to 
deflationary  situations,  by integrating  into it the Keynesian  income-adjustment  mechanism. 
lMore recently,  Tsiang  (1956,  1966) and Kohn  (1981 b) have  provided  aggregative  models 
along  Robertson-Wicksell  lines.  Kohn  shows explicitly  that there is no indeterminacy  in 
this type of model  when  the rate of interest  is pegged:  the equilibrium  conditions  determine 
a particular  rate of inflation  or deflation,  and the price level can be found  by integrating  past 
inflation.  In a sense,  this is consistent  with  Patinkin’s  dictum  about  the central  bank  having 
to concern  itself  with some nominal  magnitude  in order to anchor  the nominal  scale:  the 
nominal  rate of interest  is equivalent  to a first derivative  of a nominal  value,  and, by 
pegging  it, the bank determines  the first derivative  of the nominal  scale. 
The formal  reason  for price  indeterminacy  in models  of the liquidity  preference  type is 
that they exhibit  a homogeneity  in the quantity  of money  and price level:  these variables 
enter  the equilibrium  conditions  only  as ratios-for  example,  M(Pt  or Pp,_l.  If the 
quantity  of money  is taken  as given,  then the price level  is determinate.  If instead  the 
nominal  rate of interest  is taken  as given,  then for Lany  sequence  (or stochastic  process) 
5oThere  are earlier  hints  in the work  of Thornton  and  Mill.  See  Kohn  (1988a)  on the  latter. 27 
(M,,P,}  satisfying  the equilibrium  conditions,  the sequence  (8M,,8P,)  will  also  satisfy 
them,  for  any  0 > 0.51 
Finance-constraint/loanable-funds  models  do not share these homogeneity  properties. 
There  are two reasons  for this:  (i) the explicitly  dynamic  structure  imposed  by the finance 
constraint  (in contrast,  the structure  of liquidity  preference  models  is essentially  one of 
static equilibrium);  (ii) the heterogeneity  of agents  (the liquidity  preference  models  are 
explicitly  or implicitly  representative  agent models).  In the explicit  loanable  funds market 
there are distinct  borrowers  and lqnders;  pegging  the nominal  rate of interest  away  from its 
equilibrium  value  creates  a determinate  excess demand  or supply  which  requires  the 
monetary  authority  to purchase  or sell a determinate  amount  of securities  in exchange  for 
money-hence  a determinate  addition  or subtraction  from the money  supply.  In this 
suucture,  the change  in money  supply  does  not lead to a mere  scaling  up of all monetary 
magnitudes  with real magnitudes  unaffected.  With  the interest  rate pegged  below  the 
equilibrium  rate, for instance,  the new money  comes  into  the hands  of borrowers, 
increasing  their purchasing  power and altering  the red  allocation.  The money  holdings  of 
others  are not scaled  up at all:  their  nominal  purchasing  power  (nominal  income)  is 
predetermined  and unchanged  by the monetary  injection.52 
All this indicates  that price-level  indeterminacy  is not a substantive  economic  problem 
of the real  world,  but rather  a problem  of a particdur  cfuss of model.  McCallum’s 
diagnosis-that  pegging  the interest  rate is not a fully  specified  policy-is  quite  correct,  but it 
is correct  only  for that class of model.  A pure interest  rate peg is a fully  specified  policy  in 
finance  consuaint  models.  This  suggests  that indeterminacy  should  not be a concern  for 
510f  course.  if there  are other  nominal  assets,  then there  is homogeneity  in money,  the price  level,  and 
these assets  taken  together. 
This  type  of indeterminacy  is quite  distinct  from  the multiplicity  of equilibrium  that often  characterizes 
rational  expectations  models  (see  Section  1V.D above  on self-generating  inllationj.  These  multiple 
equilibria  involve  different  real  allocations  rather  than, as here, a single  real allocation  consistent  with a 
continuum  of nominal  scales. 
Whether  or not there  is indeterminacy  depends  on how the rate of interest  is pegged.  McCallum 
discusses  specifications  in which  certain  policy  feedback  rules,  such as setting  the money  stock  to achieve 
in interest  rate  target  or setting  the interest  rate  to achieve  a money  stock  target,  nail down  the nominal 
scale  so that thete  is no indeterminacy.  The  policy  that does  cause  a problem  is what  McCallum  calls  “a 
pure  interest  rate peg”:  the monetary  authority  pegs the interest  rate (the price  of securities)  direcffy  by 
standing  ready  to buy or sell any  amount  of securities  at that interest  rate (price).  Friedman  (1969)  seems  to 
have  in mind a policy  which  pegs  the money  growth  rate nther  lhan a “pure interest  rate”  peg.  The  former. 
but not  the  latter,  is consistent  with  his story  of  how  the interest  rate  falls  initially,  but  then  rises  above  its 
initial  level. 
%3a.le  (1982)  discusses  how  non-robust  the homogeneity  result  is in its dependence  on either  a 
representative  individual  or on precisely  proponional  additions  to all money  balances. 
This characterization  of the difference  between  liquidity preference  and finance  constraint  models  in 
terms of their  homogeneity  propcrtics  is due to Woodford  (1987d). 28 
policy-makers  trying  to choose  an appropriate  policy,  but rather  for economic  theorists 
trying  to choose  an appropriate  mode1.53 
The  aggregative  finance  constraint  models,  of the type developed  by Tsiang  and Kohn, 
while  they  do provide  useful  insights  into  the short-run  consequences  of pegging  the rate of 
interest,  are less useful  when  it comes  to the long run.  This  is so because  they  are 
essentially  pure  flow models,  ignoring  the effects  of flows  on stocks  and the feedback  from 
stocks  to flows.  They  do not take  into  account  the effect  of saving  on asset positions  or of 
investment  on the capital  stock.  Theflow  of savings  is made  to depend  on the rate of 
interest  and/or  income,  when it might  seem more reasonable  that desired  stocks depend  on 
these variables  and that the flow is the result of adjustment  over  time or aggregation  over 
heterogeneous  individuals.  Even  accepting  such a flow  formulation,  there  are some 
obvious  feedbacks  that are ignored:  investment  will affect  income;  interest  payments  to or 
from the central  bank will affect  net income;  and it will matter  how the central  bank 
disposes  of those  payments. 
Clearly,  what is required  is a fully  specified  optimizing  model  that takes all these 
considerations  into  account.  Such  a model  has been provided  by Woodford  (1985,  1987a, 
1987d).  Woodford  adds a cash-in-advance  constraint  to an overlapping  generations  model. 
The cash-in-advance  constraint  supports  a loanable  funds theory  of the determination  of 
interest  rates, and this enables  Woodford  to integrate  rigorously  a traditional  account  of the 
short-run  liquidity  effects  of open  market  operations  with an analysis  of long-run 
equilibrium,  shedding  some  light  on whether  the short-run  effects  can persist  in the long 
run.  The  role  of the overlapping  generations  structure  is not. as in Wallace’s  work  (e.g., 
1980) to support  valued  fiat money-that  is done  by the cash-in-advance  constx-aim-but  to 
provide  a “structural”  savings  function  based on explicit  intertemporai  optimization. 
Woodford  arrives  at some striking  results  for his model  economy:  “Open market 
operations  can  keep  both the nominal  and the real rate of interest  low forever,  but whereas, 
in the short run, a lower  interest  rate is achieved  only  at the cost of a rise in the price  level, 
in the long  run high and low interest  rates are found  to be equally  compatible  with price 
level  stability.”  This  result  seems  in  sharp  conuast  with  Wicksell’s  description  of  a 
j3The  finance-consuaintiioanable-iunds  structure  does not of course  rule out the muf!iplicit?: of 
equilibrium,  rather  than indeterminacy,  often  associated  with ratlonal  expcctatlons. 
Wicksell  (1905,  p.  194-5) describes  a pure credit  system  as being  in a kind of “neutral  equilibrium”: 
at the new,  higher  goods  prices  that result  from  a cumulative  process  of  inllation,  entrepreneurs  are willing 
to pay  higher  wages  even  if the interest  rate reverts  to its natural  level;  there  is no tendency  to revert  to the 
original  price  level.  Patinkin  (1965)  mistakenly  identifies  this phenomenon  (for  which  “neutral 
equilibrium”  is a good  description)  with the price  level  indctcrminacy  of liquidity  preference  models. 
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cumulative process that continues  indefinitely  so long  as the market  rate of interest  is 
pegged  below  the “natural  rate.” 
Why,  in Woodford’s  model  does  the “cumulative  process”  eventually  come  to an end 
and the price  level  stabilize.  7  According  to Wicksell,  lowering  the nominal  rate of interest 
creates  an excess  demand  for loanable  funds:  investment  rises,  saving  falls.  New money 
is injected  in the .form of loans  to satisfy  this excess demand;  this causes  inflation,  which 
lowers  the real market  rate of interest,  and so increases  the excess demand  But Wicksell’s 
pure flow  argument  neglects  the effect  the process  itself  may have  on desired  saving  or 
investment,  and  so on the normal  rate.  In Woodford’s  model,  lowering  the rate  of interest 
stimulates  investment  only  in the short run, because  this investment  brings  the marginal 
product  of capital  down  to equal  the new, lower rate of interest.  Once  the two are equal 
there is no further  stimulus  to investment,  and it retums  to its original  long-run  value-zero. 
So long  as the technology  exhibits  decreasing  returns,  the normal  rate will eventually  be 
lowered  to equal  the market  rate, so ending  any  inflationary  pressure.s4  However,  if  tastes 
and technology  were such that an excess demand  for loanable  funds could  be sustained  in 
the long run (an increasing-returns  technology,  for example?),  then presumably  the 
cumulative  process  would  continue.55 
F.  The  monetary  adjustment  mechanism  under  fixed  exchange  rates 
There  are obvious  formal  similarities  between  the central  bank’s pegging  the rate of 
interest  in a closed  economy  and its fixing  the exchange  rate in an open one.  In the former 
case, the central  bank  stands ready  to buy and sell bonds  at a declared  price  (with  money  it 
creates  or destroys);  in the latter,  it stands ready  to buy or sell foreign  exchange  at a 
declared  price.  So it is not surprising  that in the latter case too the finance  constraint  theory 
offers  some advantages  over  the liquidity  preference  theory. 
What  the liquidity  preference  theory  has to say about fixed exchange  rates is contained 
in the “monetary  approach  to the balance  of payments.”  The  basic idea is simple.  The 
economy  consists  of two aggregate  markets-a  market  for goods  and a “market  for money.” 
By Walras’ Law, one of the markets  may  be dropped  from  the analysis,  and the behavior 
of the economy  described  in terms of the other  alone.  So the market  for goods  is dropped, 
54Such  a possibility-that  the normal  rate could  be lowered  by investment  to bring  it into  equality  with 
the pegged  market  rate-was  raised  in early  discussions  of the cumulative  process  by Davidson,  Cassel,  and 
Mises  and acknowledged  as a theoretical  possibility  by Wicksell.  See Uhr(1960,  pp.  199-200)  for a 
discussion  and references. 
55See Romer  (1986),  Rebello  (1987),  and Kohn  and Marion  (1987)  for discussion  of one  type of 
increasing  returns  technology,  based on knowledge-based  growth. 30 
and the process  of international  monetary  adjustment  is analyzed  in terms of adjustment  in 
the market  for money.56 
This  monetary  approach  was attacked  by Tsiang  (1977) on the grounds  that its use of 
Walras’ Law was invalid  and its money  demand  equation  misspecified.  The  two criticisms 
are related.  Walras’ Law is a tautology,  so there  is certainly  some  sense in which  the 
mirror  image  of the supply  and demand  for goods  is a “demand”  and  “supply”  of money. 
The question  is whether  the demand  and supply  of money  so defined  correspond  in any 
way to the individual  portfolio  behavior  postulated  in the liquidity  preference  theory.  In 
more  modem  parlance,  the question  is whether  or not the aggregate  demand  for money 
defined  in this way  is structural:  if not, it is of no value  in policy  analysis.  Kohn  and 
Karacaoglu  (1989)  adapt  Woodford’s  (1985)  model  to an open  economy  to provide  a fully 
articulated  analytical  example  in which  there does exist an aggregate  money  demand 
function  of the type relied  upon  by the monetary  approach,  and show  that this aggregate 
money  demand  function  is indeed  not structural. 
The  finance  constraint  theory  has been  used  to produce  both  aggregative  and  optimizing 
models  of  the  balance  of  payments  adjustment  process.  For  the  former  see  Tsiang  (1988); 
for  the  latter  Kohn  and  Karacaoglu  (1988,  1989),  Helpman  (1981c),  and  Feenstra  (1983). 
Many  of  the  broad  results  of  the  monetary  approach  (and  of  its extension 
assets-the  portfolio  balance  approach)  are  sustained  in these  models,  but 
important  differences  in  detaiLs7 
to  multiple 
there  are 
H.  Money  and  flexible  exchange  rates5s 
In a seminal  paper,  Helpman  (198 1  b) compared  efficiency  and welfare  levels  under 
different  exchange  rate regimes.  He used  an  equilibrium  model  based  on  intertemporal 
utility  maximization,  making  such  welfare  comparisons  possible,  with  the  role  of  money 
made  explicit  through  the  use  of  finance  constraints.  Each  country’s  goods  must  be 
purchased  with  that  country’s  currency;  lenders  in a particular  currency  must  provide 
%f.  Johnson (1976, pp. X2-253):  “The central  point  of  the moncuuy  approach..  .is that balance-of- 
payments  deficits  or surpluses  ret‘lcct stock disequilibrium  between  money  demand  and supply  in the market 
for money.”  This  “strong”  version  oi  the monetary  approach  is to be distinguished  from  a “weak”  version 
that does  no more  than assert  that the balance  of payments  is essentially  a monetary  phenomenon  and that 
its understanding  requires  explicit  attention  to money  (see  Rabin and  1 cqer,  19823. 
57There  are  important  precursors  to modern  work  in thts anza.  One  IS !viIachlup (1943)  who  uses a 
Robertson  dynamic  money-flow  multiplier  (see  Section  V below)  to examine  the international  transmission 
of shocks.  Another  is a body  of work developed  oven  the last half century  in the Netherlands  (associated 
particularly  with J. G. Koopmans,  J. Zijlstrs,  and  M. W. Holuop  and reviewed  in de long,  1973)  that has 
come  to be known-rather  misleadingly-as  “Dutch  !vfonetxism.”  The  origins  of this school  are 
Wicksellian,  and  it shows  the  inliucncc  oE Robertson  more  than that of  Keynes. 
58See  also  the survey  by  Stockm;ln  (19S9). 
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borrowers  with  the  appropriate  amount  of  that  currency;  and  debts  must  be repaid  in  the 
currency  in  which  the  debt  is denominated.  Helpman  found  that  in  perfect  foresight 
equilibrium,  both  fixed  and  floating  regimes  are  Pareto-efficient.  Floating  and  one  type  of 
fixed,  a one-sided  peg,  support  the  same  “real”  equilibrium  that  would  be obtained  in  a 
frictionless  barter  model.  Lucas  (1982)  has  found  similar  neutrality  results  in  a stochastic 
equilibrium  model  with  endowment  and  monetary  shocks. 
As  Aschauer  and  Greenwood  (1983)  have  pointed  out,  however,  the  neutrality  results- 
including  the  equivalence  of  fixed  and  floating  regimes-depend  critically  on  the  assumption 
that  output  is exogenous.  Once  output  is made  endogenous,  the  “time-wedge”  property  of 
the  finance  constraint  comes  into  play.  For  example,  fixed  and  floating  regimes  are  no 
longer  equivalent,  because  only  the  latter  allows  a country  the  freedom  to  set  an  “optimum 
yield  on  money”  to remove  this  “distortion.”  Neither  is monetary  policy  still  neutral.  As 
Rotemberg  (1983)  and  Stockman  (1985)  show,  inflation  distorts  the  terms  of  trade  between 
counrries just  as it does  between  individuals  in closed  economy  models  (see  above,  Section 
IV.B).  In  Rotemberg’s  model,  inflation  worsens  the  inflating  country’s  terms  of  trade 
under  flexible  exchange  rates,  but  not  under  fixed  rates.  In  Stockman’s  model,  the 
distortion  affects  the  relative  prices  of  traded  and  non-traded  goods  differentially,  changing 
the  composition  of  domestic  output  and  the  pattern  of  international  comparative  advantage 
and  of  trade  flows. 
The  neutrality  results  also  depend  on  the  presence  of  unrestricted  financial  markets. 
The  task  of examining  how  different  frictions  might  alter  the  relative  desirability  of  different 
regimes  has  been  begun  by  Helpman  and  Razin  (1982).  In a model  with  incomplete 
financial  markets,  they  derive  sufficient  conditions  for  a floating  regime  to  be  superior  to a 
one-sided  peg.  Svensson  (1985a)  introduces  a similar  friction  into  the  Lucas  (1982) 
model:  trade  in  assets  is restricted  to occur  before  the  goods  market  opens,  creating  a 
precautionary  demand  for  money.  Here,  unlike  in the  Lucas  model,  monetary  shocks 
have  real  effects. 
can 
Recent  work  on  exchange  rate  dynamics  goes  beyond  the  derivation  of  neutrality 
propositions  in equilibrium  to examining  the  response  of  exchange  rates  to exogenous 
disturbances.  It also  examines  the  co-movement  of  exchange  rates  with  other  endogenous 
variables,  such  as prices,  interest  rates,  output,  and  the  current  account. 
Stockman  (1980)  examines  the  excess  variability  of  exchange  rates  vis ci vis relative 
prices  in a stochastic  equilibrium  framework.  This  contrasts  with  previous  work  which  has 
relied  on  price  rigidities  and  disequilibrium.  Exogenous  real  shocks  cause  co-movements  of 
prices  and  exchange  rates.  Exchnnge  rates  may  be  serially  correlated  and  may  exhibit 
sufficient  volatility  to  depart  from  purchasing  power  parity,  even  though  prices  adjust 32 
freely  to clear  markets.  This  relationship  between  the exchange  rate and the terms of trade 
cannot,  however,  be  exploited  by  government  exchange-rate  policy.  There  is more 
“action”  in  this  model  than  in a similar  one  due  to  Lucas  (1982),  because  Stockman,  like 
Svensson  (1985a),  restricts  asset  trading  to  the  time  “between”  periods.  Though,  as 
Obstfeld  and  Stockman  (1985)  point  out,  the  Lucas  model,  too  can  support  excess  volatility 
of  the  exchange  rate. 
Helprnan  and  Razin  explore  the  implications  for  exchange  rate  dynamics  of  different 
monetary  arrangements.  In one  paper  (1985),  they  incorporate  a transactions  demand  for 
money  for  financial  transactions;  in another  (1984),  they  explore  the  implications  of 
different  currency  invoicing  practices  (whether  payment  is to  be made  in  the  currency  of  the 
buyer  or of  the  seller).  The  economic  importance  of  the  details  of  financial  structure  has 
been  argued  in  the  past+.g.,  by  McKinnon  ( 1973,  1979)  and  by  Tsiang  (1977)-but  only 
in  this  recent  work  has  the  finance  constraint  approach  enabled  rigorous  mode&g. 
Persson  (1982,  p.  5-11)  notes:  “[An]  attractive  feature  in this  kind  of  model  is that  the 
explicit  formulation  of  all  money  flows  makes  it necessary  to  be very  precise  about  the 
nature  of  the  institutional  monetary  arrangements.  This  makes  it possible  to  analyze,  and 
may  even  help  to discover  important  issues  that  are  typically  neglected  in conventional 
models.” 
V.  MACROECONOMICS 
Much  of  the  recent  work  in macroeconomics  begins  by  assuming  an  economy  that  is 
essentially  stable  and  then  explains  fluctuations  in  terms  of  exogenous  real  and  monetary 
shocks  impinging  on  it.  In  the  case  of  monetary  shocks,  it attempts  to explain  how  these 
cause  real  fluctuations,  rather  than  merely  causing  fluctuations  in  the  price  level.  Work 
based  on  the  finance  constraint  theory  has  taken  a different  tack.  The  monetary-financial 
structure  is seen  less  as an  originator  of  shocks  than  as an  amplifier  and  propagator  of  other 
shocks  to  the  economy.  LMoney is generally  seen  as  passive  and  endogenous. 
The  chief  deviation-amplifying  mechanism  implied  by  finance  constraints  is the 
“multiplier”:  an  individual  experiencing  a fall  in current  income  will  reduce  his  own 
expenditure,  causing  the  income  of  others  to  fall;  or  a fum  experiencing  a fall  in current 
earnings  will  cut  back  the  scale  of  its  activity,  reducing  the  earnings  of  others.  Such 
behavior  makes  no  sense  at all  in a world  of  perfect  financial  markets.  In  such  a world, 
expenditure  should  depend  only  on  “permanent”  income,  hardly  at all on  current  income;59 
. 
5gBewley  (1977)  has shown  that the permanent  income  hypothesis  is valid only  if the sequence  of 
finance  constraints  is not binding;  he suggests,  as a result.  that the permanent  income  hypothesis  is 
plausible  empirically  only  for small, anticipated,  short-run  fluctuations,  and not for major  or unexpected 
fluctuations.  See also  Foley  and  Hcllwig  (1975). 33 
fum  activity  should  depend  on future  prospects,  not on past results.  But once  we 
recognize  the problems  inherent  in trading  without  trust in a world of asymmetric 
information,  then financial  markets  will be “imperfect,”  and there will  be finance 
constraints  and multipliers.60 
There  are two reasons  to doubt the optimality  of equilibrium  in an economy  with 
multiplier  effects.  The frst  is externalities:  actions  of one agent will affect  the trading 
possibilities  of others  through  their effect  on finance  constraints.  The  second  reason  is that 
economies  with multiplier  effects  often exhibit  multiple  equilibria  that are not Pareto 
equivalent. 
These  ideas  have  been explored  both in aggregative  and in optimizing  models. 
A.  Aggregative  models 
Multipliers,  of course,  are at the heart of the Keynesian  view  of the macroeconomic 
problem.  Suppose  exogenous  shocks  affect  the expected  profitability  of investment.  In an 
economy  with  no informational  problems  and perfect  financial  markets,  this should  cause 
only  fluctuations  in interest  rates and shifts  in expenditure  between  investment  and 
consumption.  But in an economy  with  “imperfect”  financial  markets,  such shocks  will  be 
transmitted  to the goods  and labor markets  and cause  fluctuations  in output  and in 
employment.61 
The conventional  ISLM model  is supposed  to capture  these ideas,  but it turns out to be 
a very  imperfect  vehicle  for the purpose.  Over the years  a number  of authors  have 
suggested  variations  that try to improve  it by combining  the Keynesian  income-expenditure 
mechanism  with a finance  constraint  theory  of money  and interest,  rather  than  with the 
liquidity-preference  theory  that is embodied  in the standard  ISLM model.  These  authors 
include  Robertson  (1934),  LMachlup (1939,  1943), Smith  (1958),  Tsiang  (1956,  1966), 
Ackley  (1961),  and  Kohn  (1981,  1988b). 
The advantage  of these  finance  constraint  models  is that they express  fully  the dynamics 
of the multiplier  process-Machlup  (1939), Tsiang  (1956), and Ackley  have  this as their 
6@There is considerable  empirical  evidence  that finance  constraints  do matter:  see King (1985),  Flavin 
(1984),  Mishkin  (1978),  and Dcaton  (1986)  on consumers;  and Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and Peterson  (1987)  on 
firms. 
61This  assumes  that effort  is inelastically  supplied,  so that changes  in rates  of  intertemporal 
substitution  do not cause  fluctuations  in the overall  level  of activity.  If the supply  of effort  is elastic,  then 
the distinction  would  be between  “appropriate”  fluctuations  with perfect  financial  markets  and 
“inappropriate”  or excessive  fluctuations  with imperfect  financial  markets. 
Leijonhufvud  (1981),  Tobin  (1982),  and Ackley  (1983)  have all suggested  that the basic  “hitch”  in 
Keynesian  theory  is not  insufficient  flexibility  in the labor  market,  but insufficient  nexibility  in the cupiraf 
market:  if adjustment  in the capiul  market  were  fast enough,  money  wages  would  not need  to change. 
Kohn’s results  (1981b,  1988b)  suggest  that both elements  may be necessary  (as Keynes  himself  believed). 34 
primary  purpose-and  they  therefore  shed light on a variety  of methodological  and 
substantive  issues  left obscure  by the conventional  theory.62  For example,  Machlup 
(1939),  Smith,  Tsiang  (1956),  and Kohn  (1981)  address  the relation  between  liquidity- 
preference  and loanable-funds  theories  of the rate of interest,  and Robertson, 
Tsiang  (1966),  and Kohn  (198 1) look  at the macroeconomic  consequences  of pegging 
interest  rates  (see also  Section  IV.E above). 
Kohn  (1988)  shows  that the celebrated  policy-ineffectiveness  result  of Sargent  and 
Wallace  (1975)  does not hold  for a finance  constraint  model.  The reason  it does  not is 
precisely  the explicit  modelling  of the multiplier  process.  Exogenous  investment  shocks 
provide  an opportunity  for individually  profitable  interest-rate  speculation;  this speculation 
causes  fluctuations  in the tightness  of the aggregate  finance  constraint,  and so fluctuations 
in spending.  Speculation  has a social  cost-fluctuations  in output-not  borne  by speculators. 
A monetary  policy  of counter-speculation  can reduce output  fluctuations  (at the cost of 
trading  losses  to the monetary  authority).  Such a policy  is effective,  despite  rational 
expectations,  not because  of any  informational  advantage,  but because  it can correct  the 
external  diseconomies  of private  maximizing  behavior. 
B.  Optimizing  models 
Optimizing  models  of the finance  constraint  theory  support  many  of the results  of the 
aggregative  literature.  In particular,  Grossman  and Weiss  (1983),  Bewley  (1984), 
Rotemberg  (1984),  Walsh  (1984),  Farmer  ( 1985>, Mossetti  (1987),  Woodford  (1986b, 
1988a), and Chattejee  (1988)  all show that in the presence  of finance  constraints  policy  is 
effective.63 
But what  sort of policy  is desirable?  One cannot  address  such normative  questions 
with  aggregative  models:  for example,  one cannot  presume,  as Keynesian  theory  tends  to 
do, that reducing  fluctuations  is necessarily  a good thing.  Whether  it is or not depends  on 
the reason  for the fluctuations.b4  However,  optimizing  models  can provide  some 
guidance. 
Mossetti  (1987) and Chattejee  (1988) have models  in which  real disturbances  cause  the 
basic fluctuations.  They  both conclude  that the monetary  system  should  not constrain  these 
%Cohn  (1981b)  shows  that the ISL%l model  describes  a particular  equilibrium  over  time  of the 
loanable  funds  model,  and that in this sense  the loanable  funds model  represents  a generalization  of the 
ISLM  model.  The  reasons  why  Keynes  chose  to express  the essentially  dynamic  multiplier  process  in a 
static  model  are discussed  in Kohn  (1986). 
63While  most of the models  stress  finance  constraints  on demand,  Farmer  (1985)  and Mossetti  (1987) 
consider  the effects  via the supply  side of the economy. 
%o  much  was clear  to Robertson  in  1926, and was an important  theme  in his resistance  to the 
Keynesian  Revolution. 35 
(appropriate)  real fluctuations,  and that moneq  policy  should  be accommodating.  The 
policy  that achieves  this best is one that targets  the rate of interest,  not one that targets 
monetary  aggregates. 
Woodford  (1986b,  1988a) has a rather  different  story.  There  are no exogenous 
disturbances,  but the economy  is subject  to endogenous  “sunspot”  fluctuations.  Woodford 
shows  that models  with finance  constraints  (with incomplete  financial  markets)  have 
precisely  the dynamic  properties  needed  to sustain  self-fulfilling  rational-expectations 
equilibria  (“sunspot”  equilibria).  In one model,  “capitalists”  invest  in production  according 
to their expectations  of profitability:  there is an accommodating  monetary  policy  that allows 
them  to spend  as they  wish  (i.e., they  are not finance  constrained).  Their  spending  affects 
the income,  and so the expenditure,  of “workers”  who are finance-constrained,  so that the 
capitalists’  expectations  of profitability  are self-fulfilling.  Changes  in expectations  of 
profitability  may  be triggered  by essentially  irrelevant  variables  (“sunspots”),  introducing 
extraneous-and  therefore  welfare-reducing-fluctuations  in real  variables.65 
Note  that  the  accommodating  monetary  policy  that  seems  desirable  in the  face  of  real 
shocks  in  the  models  of  Mossetti  and  Chatterjee  is also  a necessary  condition  for  the 
extraneous  “sunspot”  disturbances  in Woodford’s  model.  However,  Woodford  (1986b) 
shows  that  an  appropriatefiscal  policy  can  eliminate  the  sunspot  fluctuations  as possible 
equilibria,  so that  the  accommodating  monetary  policy  need  not  be abandoned. 
VI.  RELATED WORK 
A.  Other  approaches  to  money 
Development  of the finance  constraint  theory  has  not  been  the  only  response  to the 
perceived  deficiencies  of  conventional  monetary  theory.  Another  major  line  of  research  has 
built  on  Samuelson’s  (1958)  overlappin,  3  (J oenerations  framework  as the  analytical  basis  for 
a theory  of  money.  Despite  superficial  differences,  there  are  substantial  similarities 
between  this  approach  and  the  finance  constraint  theory. 
It is often  suggested  that  the  difference  between  the  two  is that  the  overlapping 
generations  model  treats  money  purely  as a store  of  value.  while  the  finance  consnaint 
theory  treats  it purely  as a medium  of  exchange  (McCallum.  1983;  Tobin,  1980).  This  is 
not  the  case.  The  key  feature  of  the  overlappin,  a  0 oenerations  model  that  creates  a role  for 
money  is a problem  of  double  coincidence  of  wants  that  AYlics  intergenerational  trade. 
While  there  are  benefits  to such  trade,  it cannot  take  place  in the  absence  of  an 
65’This may  be seen as a formalization  of similar  ideas put lorward  by Hawuey,  Lavington,  and others. 
See  for example,  Hawuey  (192Yb. pp. ‘9%  100). intergenerational  medium  of exchange.  Money  can play  this role.  It is quite  possible  to set 
up formally  identical  models  with the same double  coincidence  problem,  but without  the 
overlapping  generations  interpretation.  For example,  Cass and Yaari  (1966)  and 
Townsend  (1980)  set up models  with  a finite  number  of “spatially  separated”  agents. 
The  use of money  as an intergenerational  medium  of exchange  in overlapping 
generations  models  involves  the same sort of time wedge in trade that results  from  the 
finance  constraint.  Hence,  entirely  parallel  results  are obtained  on the welfare  loss due to 
inflation  and on the optimality  of a zero nominal  rate of interest  (the “optimum  quantity” 
result)  (Helpman  and Sadka,  1979;  Wallace,  1980). 
Just as money  acts as a medium  of exchange  in overlapping  generations  models,  so 
does it act as a store of value  in finance  constraint  models.  Thus,  the multiplicity  of 
equilibrium  that is a well known  property  of  overlapping  generations  models  is also a 
property  of finance  constraint  models.  Indeed  as Woodford  (1988a)  and  Huo (1987)  have 
shown,  the two models  can be reduced  to an identical  non-linear  difference  equation.  This 
equation  is precisely  of the type  that supports  “sunspot” equilibria  and complex  dynamics 
(see Section  IV.D  above  and Woodford,  1986a,  1988a). 
While  there is, therefore,  very  little difference  between  the two approaches  at the formal 
level,  there are important  differences  in the “semantics”-the  interpretation  of the formal 
structure. 
For example,  in overlapping  generations  models,  the specification  of money  as a 
vehicle  of life-cycle  saving  is unappealing  on its face (Tobin,  1980) and leads  to some 
analytical  red herrings.  Since  life-cycle  saving  (or, equivalently,  the mediation  of 
intergenerational  trade)  is all there is for any asset to do, all assets must bear the same rate 
of return:  if one  asset has a higher  yield,  it will leave  the others  with no place  in the model. 
As a result,  it is hard to accommodate  both money  and, say, bonds  in the same model 
without  there  being  some restriction  that prevents  them from being  perfect  substitutes.  One 
device  is to assume  some  sort of “legal restriction”  imposed  by the government.  But this 
seems  awfully  ad hoc,  vitiating  the oft-heard  claim  that, unlike  anything  else, overlapping 
generations  models  are built from  first principles.  What  is the underlying  structure  that has 
led to the imposition  of these restrictions? 
On the other  hand,  the chief  advantage  of overlapping  generations  models  is that in 
them  the total  stock  of wealth  is endogenous,  determined  by life-cycle  saving.  In contrast, 
in conventional  macro  models  of the Hicks-Tobin  type, the total  stock of wealth  is taken  as 37 
given  and the model  determines  only  its  allocation  across  different  assets.66  Much  of  this 
advantage  of  the  overlapping  generations  model  is lost  when  money  is neated  as a life-cycle 
asset,  because  of  the  ease  with  which  results  on  saving  can  be  misinterpreted  as results  on 
money  demand. 
One  way  to have  the  advantages  of  the  overlapping  generations  model  without  its 
disadvantages  is to impose  finance  constraints  on  intragenerational  tiade,  so differentiating 
money  from  other  assets  as the  unique  medium  of  exchange  (see,  for  example,  the  models 
of  Woodford,  1985,  1987a,  d,  and  Kohn  and  Karacaoglu  1988,  1989). 
A  third  approach  to monetary  theory  that  has  enjoyed  some  popularity  recently  involves 
the  use  of  optimizing  models  in which  real  balances  have  ken  made  an  argument  in  agents’ 
utility  functions.  Indeed,  it has  been  argued  that  the  results  of  the  fmance  constraint  theory 
can  be replicated  with  models  of  this  type  (Fischer,  1983;  Feenstra,  1986).  On  the  face  of 
it, this  would  appear  plausible.  In finance  constraint  models,  money  has  indirect  utility, 
should  it not  be  possible  to find  an equivalent  direct  utility  formulation?  Svensson  (1985b) 
shows,  first,  that  the  answer  is,  not  necessarily,  and,  second,  that  even  if  it is possible,  the 
appropriate  direct  utility  function  may  not  be  “structural.”  A change,  say,  in  policy  regime, 
in  the  fmancial  structure  of  the  model,  or  even  a shift  in analysis  from  stationary  states  to 
dynamics,  will  require  a tiiflerenr  direct  utility  function.  Stockman  (1989)  shows  too  that, 
except  in  special  cases,  bringin  g money  into  the  utility  function  in this  way  will  also  bring 
in other  variables  from  the  finance  consrraint,  such  as  investment,  that  look  strange  as 
arguments  in  a utility  function.  &lore  generally,  the  use  of  models  with  money  in the  utility 
function  seems  a poor  research  strate_q,  because  it imposes  too  little  structure.  However. 
as LeRoy  (1984)  suggests,  such  models  may  have  value  as a heuristic  in suggesting 
avenues  to  be  explored  by  other  methods  or  in  the  exposition  of  results  established  in other 
ways. 
B.  Finance  constraints  without  money 
There  is a strong  affinity  between  the  finance  constraint  theory  of  money  and  work  that 
looks  at the  implications  of  finance  constraints  (or  incomplete  financial  markets)  in general- 
not  necessarily  in  relation  to money.67 
66The  implications  of this dtiltxence  ior ~1sset  ~uluatron cxr  be profound:  jti,  l’or ~xampie, Tirole 
(1985). 
67For a survey of  that literature,  see Gertler  (1988).  As Gertler  suggests,  thus literature  has antecedents 
in the work  of “Classical”  writers  such % Hawuey  (19%)  and Fishcr( 1933).  Whether  Gurley  and Shaw 
(1960)  should  be included  as antecedents  IS less clear.  Although  they do stress the importance  of credit  and 
the role of fmancial  intermediaries,  they do so m the context  of a Hicks-Keynes-Tobm  portfolio  theory  of 
an entirely  conventional  kmd.  The  recent  work on finance  constramts  rests on very  different  theoretical 
foundations. 38 
Work  on the microfoundations  of  financial  market  “imperfections”  in  asymmetric 
information  and  incentive  problems  parallels  the  work  on  the  microfoundations  of  money 
described  in  Section  III.  For  example,  S tiglitz  and  Weiss  ( 198 1) cite  adverse  selection  as 
an obstacle  to  using  interest  rates  alone  to allocate  credit.  Greenwald,  Stiglitz,  and  Weiss 
(1984)  stress  the  importance  of  the  institutions  that  specialize  in evaluating  trustworthiness 
(banks)  and  the  role  of  the  continuing  relationship  between  borrowers  and  lenders  as  an 
incentive  not  to default.  They  also  argue  that  adverse  selection  prevents  firms  rationed  by 
banks  from  turning  to  the  direct  market.  Mayshar  (1982,  1983)  uses  asymmetries  of 
information  and  differences  of  opinion  to explain  the  increasing  cost  to  fms  of  additional 
finance.  Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  (1988)  argue  that  firms  face  increasing  borrowing  costs 
because  of  the  adverse  selection  problems  inherent  in  selling  equity.68 
Macro  models  in  which  firms  face  imperfect  financial  markets  have  properties  that  are 
similar  to  those  of  macro  models  incorporating  the  finance  constraint  theory  of  money. 
There  are  “multiplier  effects.”  Policy  is effective  despite  rational  expectations.  Some 
examples  are  Blinder  and  Stiglitz  (1983),  Blinder  (1983),  Farmer  (1984a),  and  Greenwald 
and  Stiglitz  (1988).  The  general  story  is that  firms  need  credit  for  working  capital:  factors 
of  production  must  be  purchased  before  firms  receive  revenue  from  sales.  Hence,  changes 
in  the  availability  of  credit  will  have  effects  on  output.  Moreover,  Woodford  (1987b,  c, 
1988b)  shows  that  the  necessary  condition  for  sunspot  equilibria  and  complex  dynamics  is 
the  incompleteness  of  financial  markets,  so  that  models  with  “non-monetary”  finance 
consuaints  exhibit  the  same  sort  of dynamic  behavior  as monetary  finance  constraint 
models. 
It is sometimes  suggested  that  this  credit  story  is an  alternative  to  stories  that  stress  the 
role  of  money.  At  least  implicitly,  however,  the  credit  story  is a monetary  story:  if firms 
could  pay  for  factors  of  production  with  their  own  IOUs,  then  availability  of  credit  would 
not  be  an  issue.  Their  need  to  pay  with  money,  and  to  borrow  that  money  if they  do  not 
have  it,  is of  the  essence.69 
C.  Other  related  work 
There  are  interesting  parallels  between  the  view  of  macroeconomic  instability  that 
comes  out  of  finance  constraint  models  and  recent  work  on  the  stability  of  general 
equilibrium.  For  example,  Shubik  (19531,  modelling  the  economy  as a “playable  game,” 
68As Bewley  (1982),  Lucas  (1983),  and Townsend  (1987)  show,  finance  constraints  have  implications 
for asset  pricing.  They  find  that such  “imperfections”  can account  for many  of the phenomena,  such as 
“excess  volatility,”  that are anomalous  from  the point of view of the standard  perfect-market  theory. 
@These  non-monetary  mod&  arc very  similar  to IMossetti’s (1987)  monetary  model. 39 
and Fisher  (1983),  modelling  individual  behavior  “out of equilibrium,”  have  both  been 
drawn  into detailed  consideration  of essentially  monetary  issues. 
The monetary  nature of trade may  at the same time both increase  stability  and decrease 
it.  As Shubik  (1973) has noted,  money  is a strategic  decoupling  device  that enables 
individuals,  in an economy  out of equilibrium,  to act without  prior coordination  with 
others.  Financial  buffer  stocks  (together  with other  buffer  stocks)  make  it easier  for the 
system  to adjust  to exogenous  shocks,  because  the adjustment  may  be spread out over 
time.  On the other  hand,  finance  constraints  do constrain.  In some  situations,  say when 
financial  buffer  stocks  are exhausted,  potentially  stabilizing  behavior  may  be rendered 
infeasible  because  it violates  finance  constraints.  Leijonhufvud  (1973) and Howitt  (1978) 
have reconciled  these conflicting  tendencies  to increasing  and decreasing  stability  by 
suggesting  that monetary  economies  exhibit  “corridor”  stability.  That  is, they  are quite 
stable  with  respect  to small  shocks,  but once  they  are displaced  far enough  from 
equilibrium,  they  become  unstable. 
While  the problem  of honesty  or trust makes  finance  constraints  necessary,  their 
(socially)  optimai  degree  of tighmess  might  well vary  with the overall  situation  of the 
economy.  In this connection,  Shubik  (1973)  has done  some  interesting  work  on optimum 
bankruptcy  laws.  Abuse  of the ability  to borrow  must be discouraged,  but not to the point 
of discouraging  legitimate  borrowing.  Note the divergence  between  the private  and social 
costs of erring  in one direction  or the other:  the degree  of tightness  of finance  constraints 
has an element  of public  good about  it.  Excessive  laxity  seems likely  to have only 
distributional  consequences,  but excessive  tightness  may result  in inefficient 
macroeconomic  fluctuations. 
Another  class of model  that exhibits  important  externalities  of this type is the search 
equilibrium  model  pioneered  by Diamond  (e.g.,  1982,  1984) ).  In this class  of models,  an 
individual’s  decision  to engage  in trade has positive  (non-pecuniary)  external  effects  on the 
trading  opportunities  of others,  because  markets  are “thin.”  Like finance  constraint 
models,  these models  exhibit  a multiplicity  of self-fulfilling  expectations  equilibria  that are 
not Pareto  equivalent.  For example,  Diamond  (1988) shows  that an economy  with credit 
exhibits  a kind of “bootstrap  equilibrium”:  individuals  will be inclined  to give credit  to 
others  only  when  they receive  credit  themselves.  This  suggests,  by the way,  one  answer 
to those  who claim  that tight monq  will have no effect  because agents  will  substitute  credit: 
agents  who  find  their own  finance  constraints  tightened  are likely  to respond  by reducing, 
not increasing,  the credit  they extend  to others  (the non-cooperative  rather  than  the 
cooperative  solution). 